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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two years, banner headlines have regaled read-
ers with the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings of such major corpora-
tions as Macy's, TWA, and Federated Department Stores.1 These
bankruptcies represent only a smattering of the myriad large and
small businesses that have sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code in increasing numbers each year since the
Code's inception in 1978.' Both the magnitude and sheer number
of these Chapter 11 cases compels an examination of whether
Chapter 11 is satisfying its intended purposes. Is Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy merely a stalling mechanism by which these businesses can
temporarily fend off an inevitable liquidation, or does it instead
provide an avenue for these businesses to reorganize successfully?
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A., University of
Illinois, 1979; J.D., University of Illinois, 1982. Research for this Article was partially fund-
ed by 'grants from the Robert W. Maupin Faculty Research Fellowship and the Edgar
Mayfield Faculty Research Fellowship. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable
research assistance of Curtis Bailey, Suzanne Dugan, BLky. Owenson Kilpatrick, and Nan-
cy Ripperger and the indispensable secretarial assistance of Susan Cessac. The author
would also like to thank Joy Fulton, Barbara Neilson, Lee Oster, and Peter Wiedenbeck
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1 RH. Macy & Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on January 27,
1992. Carla Lazzareschi, R.H. Macy Files For Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at Al.
Federated Department Stores, which operates 140 department stores, including
Bloomingdale's and Burdines, filed for Chapter 11 relief in January 1990. Carla
Lazzareschi, Macys Seeks Bankruptcy Protection; Q & A, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at DI.
TWA filed for Chapter 11 bankriptcy protection on January 31, 1992. Christopher Corey,
TWA Plan May Hit Turbulence, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 1992, at 1E.
2 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)). For a discussion
of the statistics illustrating the escalating numbers of Chapter 11 filings, see infra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
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When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783
and created the Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions, it envisioned
that troubled businesses could use Chapter 11 as a tool to restruc-
ture and continue as viable concerns.4 The House committee re-
port emphasized that "the purpose of a business reorganization
case, unlike a liquidation, is to restructure a business's finances so
that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs,
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. "
Unfortunately, the goals of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy provi-
sions have not materialized in practice. Empirical studies estimate
that only between ten and twenty-seven percent of all businesses
that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief successfully reorganize.6
Thus, the vast majority of businesses seeking Chapter 11 protec-
tion ultimately fail in their reorganization efforts. The failure of
these businesses has a devastating impact on the national econo-
my.7 For example, on January 27, 1992, R.H. Macy & Company
("Macy's") filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Macy's operates 251
department stores throughout the nation with annual sales of over
3 92 Stat. at 2549.
4 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1978), riprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
5 Id.
6 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 107 (1983); Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of
Chapter 11 (Oct., 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Notre Dame Law Re-
view).
In 1989, Ed Flynn, Management Analyst for the Bankruptcy Division of the Statisti-
cal Analysis and Reports Division of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, prepared a statistical analysis of Chapter 11 cases, using data prepared by an
Ernst & Young, Inc. audit of confirmed Chapter 11 cases. Flynn, supra, at 13. The analy-
sis was based upon the review of 2,400 confirmed Chapter 11 cases that have been filed
since 1979. Id. The data showed that reorganization plans were confirmed in only 17%
of Chapter 11 cases, and that over 25% of the confirmed plans were liquidating plans.
Id. Thus, Mr. Flynn estimated that only between 10% and 12% of businesses seeking
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection culminated in a successful bankruptcy reorganization.
Id. Of course, in rare circumstances Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings are dismissed when
the debtor corporation is purchased prior to the confirmation of the reorganization plan.
These cases may not be reflected in the foregoing statistics.
Professor Lynn M. LoPucki conducted an empirical study of Chapter 11 cases filed
in the Bankruptcy Courts of the Western District of Missouri during 1979. LoPucki's data
revealed that of the 41 businesses that had filed for Chapter 11 relief in 1979, only 11
of those businesses, or 27%, had successfully reorganized by 1983. LoPucki, supra, at 107.
With the exception of these two studies, little data exists regarding the success of Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy filings.
7 The immediate economic impact can be seen through examples such as lost jobs
and defaulted loans. The statement is not intended to address possible long-term eco-
nomic benefits, such as allocative efficiency in the market.
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seven billion dollars, employs over 69,000 people, and purchases
goods from over 20,000 suppliers.' If Macy's is unsuccessful in its
reorganization attempt, the assets of the corporation will have to
be liquidated. As a result, it is likely that 69,000 people will lose
their jobs, and 20,000 suppliers will lose a major, if not primary,
purchaser of their goods.* It is easy to envision the domino effect
that just this one failed reorganization could have on the national
economy if Macy's is unable to restructure successfully.
Similarly, unsuccessful Chapter 11 reorganizations of small
businesses can also have 'a devastating impact on a local economy.
For example, Grant Hardware ("Grant"), a national manufacturer
of aluminum and steel drawer slides for office furniture and cabi-
nets, relocated its operations to Harrisonville, Missouri.9
Harrisonville is a small town of 8,000 located thirty miles south of
Kansas City, Missouri." To help attract the manufacturer to the
area, the city procured $1,700,000 in low interest bank loans,
$395,000 in Community Development Block Grants, and $360,000
in state loan guaranties for Grant. 2 In turn, the manufacturer
brought 450 jobs to the area, becoming the city's largest employ-
er. 3 In December of 1990, the corporation filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. 4 If Grant had been unable to reorganize
successfully, a large portion of the city's work force would have
been unemployed, local businesses would have suffered a loss of
business due to the relocation of Grant's former employees, and
local banks would have lost substantial sums due to the inability of
both Grant and its unemployed work force to repay their loans.
Fortunately, this scenario did not occur. While Grant was in bank-
ruptcy, a German company purchased the corporation, retained
350 employees, repaid the secured debt in full, and repaid nearly
twenty percent of Grant's unsecured debt.I"
8 See Lazzareschi, RH. Macy Files for Bankrupty, supra note 1, at Al.
9 Dan Margolies, Germans to Buy Bankrupt Grant, Saving Jobs and Creditors' Money,
KAN. CITY Bus. J., Sept. 20, 1991, at 1.
10 Dan Margolies, Grant's Rent Doubled by Parent Before Bankruptcy, KAN. CITY Bus. J.,
Jan. 25, 1991, at 2.
11 Id. The bank loans were part of the MOBUCKS program under which state funds
are deposited in banks throughout the state in return for their agreement to lend the
money at low interest rates to local businesses.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Margolies, supra note 9, at 1.
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The economic impact of unsuccessful Chapter 11 bankruptcies
is even more troubling when one considers the escalating number
of Chapter 11 petitions each year. As of September 30, 1991,
Chapter 11 filings for the preceding twelve-month period totaled a
staggering 20,394,16 a figure which represents more than a four-
teen percent increase over the 17,789 filings of the previous
year.1 7 Moreover, experts predict that this pattern will contin-
ue.
18
No studies have been conducted which focus on the reasons
why the Chapter 11 provisions have proven to be an ineffective
mechanism for restructuring financially troubled corporations. One
of the most likely factors accounting for the low success rate of
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, however, appears to be the tax treatment
afforded the net operating losses 9 of corporations seeking Chap-
ter 11 relief.2 0 A financially troubled corporation is far more like-
ly to reorganize successfully if it can offset its income earned after
bankruptcy with its net operating losses incurred prior to bank-
ruptcy.21 Although section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code
16 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, TABLE F-2 (1991). This data is based only on Chapter 11 business filings.
17 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, TABLE F-2 (1990). This data is also based only on Chapter 11 business
filings. Although- some might argue that the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings from
1990 to 1991 was caused by a downturn in the economy, statistics show that there has
been an increase in Chapter 11 filings even in good economic times. For example, Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy filings increased dramatically from 20,023 in 1984 to 24,442 in 1986, a
period during which general economic conditions were considered relatively good. See
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, TABLE 10 (1989).
18 See, e.g., Alison L. Cowan, Ringside Seat on Corporate Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1992, at DI.
19 Net operating losses ("NOLs") are defined infra notes 26-30 and accompanying
texL
20 One commentator has suggested that a corporation's ability to undergo a success-
ful reorganization is primarily dependent on its ability to protect its net operating losses
in bankruptcy. See Robert A. Rizzi, Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations, 19 J. CORP.
TAX'N 134, 134 (1992). Other commentators have observed that "[tihe reduced tax bur-
den that results from preserving the NOL [in bankruptcy] may even provide the incre-
mental cash flow that pushes the company over the fine line between a failed and a
successful restructuring." Howard I. Sniderman et al., A Tax Overuiew of Troubled Company
Debt Restructuring, 21 TAx ADVISER 199, 199 (1990). For a discussion of the tax treatment
of net operating losses in bankruptcy, see infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text.
21 In the recent case of Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In
re Prudential Lines Inc.), 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 82 (1991), the
Second Circuit held that a debtor corporation's net operating loss carryovers are a valu-
able asset and constitute "property of the estate" within the meaning of § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 569. Accordingly, the court barred the debtor corporation's par-
[Vol. 68:13
NET OPERATING LOSSES
contains special provisions governing the preservation of net oper-
ating losses in Title 11 proceedings,22 these provisions have prov-
en wholly inadequate in practice. Accordingly, an amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code is necessary if a corporation is to be
allowed to utilize its net operating losses after bankruptcy and
thereby preserve one of its most valuable assets.This Article is premised upon two assumptions. First, it as-
sumes that although the Chapter 11 provisions have not yet prov-
en successful in practice,, the goals underlying those provisions are
laudable.' Accordingly, the Article asserts that Congress must act
to remedy the ills of the Chapter 11 provisions in order to make
them a more viable alternative to the Chapter 7 liquidation.24
Second, the Article assumes that a policy of tax neutrality
underlies section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code. In other
words, the purpose of the net operating loss provisions is to make
tax law neutral so that transactions are entered into solely for
business reasons and are not based on tax considerations, such as
acquiring a troubled corporation's net operating losses to shelter
otherwise taxable income.25
ent from taking a worthless stock deduction with respect to the debtor's stock because
such action would have destroyed the net operating losses and, therefore, violated the
automatic stay authorized by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 573-74.
22 I.R.C. § 382(0 (5)-(6) (1988 & West Supp. 1992). For a discussion of these special
bankruptcy provisions, see infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text.
23 There are, however, those commentators who argue that Chapter 11 should be
abolished in its entirety. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043,'1078 (1992). Others question whether the underlying pre-
mises of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions have been justified. See, e.g., THOMAS H.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrTs OF BANKRUPTCY LAw, 209-24 (1986); Douglas G. Baird,
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986). A response to
the arguments made by these commentators is beyond the scope of this Article.
24 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
25 A number of commentators have written articles addressing the issue of whether
tax neutrality is the true policy underlying § 382. See, e.g., Michael L. Schultz, Section 382
and the Pursuit of Neutrality in the Treatment of Net Operating Loss Canovers, 39 KAN. L. REV.
59 (1990); Daniel L. Simmons, Net Operating Losses and Section 382: Searching For a Limita-
tion on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
Similarly, several commentators have suggested alternatives to the treatment of net
operating loss carryovers set forth in § 382. For example, some argue that corporations
should be reimbursed for their losses on a yearly basis by the government. See George
K. Yin, Of Diamonds and Coak A Retrospective Examination of the Loss Carryover Controversy, 48
N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 41-1, 41-28 (PL 2 1990) and articles cited therein. Others
argue that a corporation should only be entitled to losses to the extent of paid-in capital
and past earnings, so that any loss based on creditors' investments would be disallowed.
Id at 41-39. Still others suggest that the free transferability of losses should be allowed..
Id. at 41-24.
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This Article will first outline the history of judicial and statuto-
ry limitations on the free transferability of net operating losses,
highlighting congressional attempts to afford more favorable treat-
ment to troubled corporations reorganizing in Title 11 proceed-
ings. It will then examine the operation of section 382 of the 1986
Code, again focusing on those provisions designed to assist in the
successful reorganization of these corporations, and will demon-
strate the wholesale inability of these provisions to preserve the
net operating losses of troubled corporations. Finally, the Article
will propose an amendment to section 382 that would increase the
likelihood that corporations will be allowed to retain their net
operating losses following bankruptcy. This amendment would
improve the success rate of Chapter 11 bankruptcies, effectuate
the legislative policies underlying section 382, and reduce the
devastating economic impact of corporate liquidations.
II. HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON NET
OPERATING Loss CARRYOVERS
A corporation incurs a net operating loss when its allowable
deductions for a taxable year exceed its gross income for that
year.26 As early as 1918, Congress recognized a need to allow a
corporation to offset its losses from one taxable year against in-
come earned in prior or subsequent taxable years27 in order to
prevent distortions created by the use of an arbitrary annual ac-
counting system of taxation. 28 Under present law, a corporation
26 I.R.C. § 172(c) (1988 & West Supp. 1992).
27 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919). Under section
204(b) of the Act, a corporation was permitted to carry a net operating loss back one
year or forward one year.
28 S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1919), reprinted in JACOB S.
SEIDMAN, LEGISLATrVE HtsToRy OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws, 1861-1939, at 901 (1938).
The report stated:
At the present time no recognition is given to net losses; that is, if in any
year the losses and expenses of a taxpayer exceed his gross income the excess
(or in other words the net loss) can not [sic] be carried over into the next
year . . . . The chief merit of the present plan is its simplicity of administration.
But it does not adequately recognize the exigencies of business, and, under our
present high rates of taxation, many often result in grave injustice.
Id. For example, without the net operating loss carryover provisions, a corporation that
had a $50,000 loss in Year One because of front-loaded expenses, and $50,000 of income
in Year Two would have to pay tax on the $50,000 of income recognized in Year Two
and would receive no benefit from Year One's loss. Conversely, an identical corporation
whose expenses fortuitously fell within the same taxable year as its income would pay no
tax. This result violates principles of horizontal equity-that similarly situated taxpayers be
[Vol. 68:133138
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can carry a net operating loss back three years' and forward fif-
teen years' to offset income that it earns during those years.
A. Restrictions on Net Operating Loss Carryovers Before
the 1954 Code: Initial Attempts by the Courts
and Congress to Limit Free Transferability
Net operating losses are a very valuable commodity because
they can be used to offset otherwise taxable income. Soon after
net operating loss carryovers became part of the Code in 1918,
profitable taxpayers realized that if they could acquire a loss cor-
poration and succeed to its net operating losses, they could use
those net operating losses to reduce or completely eliminate the
income tax on their profits. Even before the first objective stan-
dards for limiting the transfer of net operating losses among tax-
payers were codified in 1954, both the courts and Congress at-
tempted to impose restrictions on their transferability.
1. Judicial Restrictions on the Free Transferability of Net
Operating Losses
The courts, not Congress, first placed restrictions on the free
transferability of net operating losses." The issue was squarely
raised before the United States Supreme Court for the first time
in 1934. In New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,3 2 Colonial Ice Corpo-
ration, the taxpayer's predecessor, was organized for the purpose
treated equally. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO BROADENING THE BASE AND LOWERING THE RATES OF THE
INCOME TAX 3 (1982) (the horizontal equity concept requires that "taxpayers with equal
incomes should have equal tax liabilities").
For a good discussion of the role of net operating loss carryovers generally, see
Peter L. Faber, Net Operating Loss Caryovers in Corporate Acquisitions After the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 39 U.S.C. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 2-1, 201.1 (1987).
29 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992). The entire net operating loss is first
carried to the three carryback years, beginning with the earliest year, and used to offset
any income generated during those years. Any unused net operating losses can then be
carried forward to offset income for years following the year of loss in chronological
order. I.R.C. § 172(b)(2). A taxpayer, however, may elect to relinquish any right to use
the carryback period pursuant to I.R.C. § 172(b)(3). A taxpayer might choose to make
such an election, for example, when the tax rates applicable to carryover years, and
hence the value of the losses during those year, exceed the rates applicable to carryback
years. See Faber, supra note 28, at 2-4.
30 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A)(ii).
31 For a discussion of the early statutory limitations on the free transferability of net
operating losses, see infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
32 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
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of producing and selling ice. Soon after its organization, however,
it became clear that the company would be unable to make a
profit. Creditors and stockholders organized committees whose
investigations culminated in an agreement which included plans to
organize a new corporation to produce and sell ice. Accordingly,
New Colonial Ice Company succeeded to the assets, liabilities, and
business of the old company in 1922. The shares of Colonial Ice
Corporation were retired and replaced by shares of New Colonial
Ice Company. The shareholders of the old corporation became
the shareholders of the new corporation. The new corporation's
capital structure was substantially similar to that of the old corpo-
ration as well.3
The Supreme Court faced the issue of whether New Colonial
Ice Company succeeded to the net operating losses sustained by
Colonial Ice Corporation and could use such losses to offset its
taxable income for the period following the reorganization."4 Re-
lying on .section 204(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921,' 5 the Court
disallowed the successor corporation's use of its predecessor's net
operating losses. 6 The Court reasoned that only the taxpayer
who sustained the loss would be allowed a deduction under sec-
tion 204(b), and that the net operating loss could not be trans-
ferred. 7 The Court rejected the contention that the new corpo-
ration was for all practical purposes the same entity as the old cor-
poration and, therefore, was the same taxpayer. According to the
Court, the two corporations were distinct taxable entities, evi-
denced in part by the fact that the shareholders and creditors had
abandoned the old company and turned to the new corporation
"because they regarded it as a distinct corporate entity and there-
fore free from difficulties attending the old one. "1 Thus, the
33 Id. at 437-38.
34 Id. at 437.
35 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 227, 231 (1921).
36 New Colonial Ice, 292 U.S. at 440.
37 The pertinent language of § 204(b) provides:
If for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1920, it appears upon
the production of evidence satisfaciory to the Commissioner that any taxpayer
has sustained a net loss, the amount thereof shall be deducted from the net
income of the taxpayer for the succeeding taxable year; and if such net loss is in
excess of the net income for such succeeding taxable year, the amount of such
excess shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the
next succeeding taxable year; the deduction in all cases to be made under regu-
lations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.
Section 204(b), 42 Stat. at 231 (emphasis added).
38 New Colonial Ice, 292 U.S. at 441. Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code of
[Vol. 68:133
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Court precluded New Colonial Ice Company from utilizing the net
operating losses sustained by its predecessor corporation.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in New Colonial Ice, a
profitable corporation wishing to offset its income with a loss
corporation's net operating losses could simply merge into the loss
corporation, with the loss corporation as the surviving entity. Be-
cause the loss corporation's legal identity had not changed, its net
operating losses would survive the merger. The combined corpo-
rations could then use those losses to offset future income.39
Just five years after it decided New Colonial Ice, the Supreme
Court, in Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,' retreated somewhat
from its earlier position. In that case, Metropolitan Edison ac-
quired the assets and assumed the liabilities of Metropolitan Power
Company in a transaction that, although not a true merger under
state law, nevertheless was found to constitute a de facto merger.
Thereafter, Metropolitan Edison liquidated a former subsidiary of
Metropolitan Power Company and retired its bonds. Metropolitan
Edison then deducted the subsidiary's unamortized bond discount
from its gross income.41 The 'Supreme Court allowed the deduc-
tion on the grounds that the initial transaction constituted a de
facto merger, and, therefore, the surviving entity could succeed to
the tax attributes of the merged corporation.42 In essence, the
Supreme Court's holding seemed to indicate that when one corpo-
ration merged into another, the successor corporation was in sub-
stance the same taxpayer as the one that went out of existence
and, accordingly, should be entitled to use the nonsurviving
corporation's deductions. 4
1954, I.RC. § 382 (1954) (repealed 1986), overruled New Colonial I. For a discussion of
§ 382 under the 1954 Code, see infra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
39 See BORIs I. BrITKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 16.02, at 16-7 (5th ed. 1987). According to one commenta-
tor, "the message of the courts [after New Colonial Ice] was that the law did not prohibit
trafficking in loss carryovers as long as the transaction took the proper legal form."
Schultz, supra note 25, at 63.
40 306 U.S. 522 (1939).
41 Id. at 524-26.
42 Id. at 529.
43 The Supreme Court's holding in Metropolitan Edison extended only to the succes-
sor corporation's deduction of unamortized bond discounts. Several circuit courts, how-
ever, later expanded that holding to encompass other tax attributes, such as unused
excess profits tax credits (which are similar in concept to net operating loss carryovers).
See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1955);
Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Jones v.
Noble Drilling Co., 135 F.2d 721, 724-25 (10th Cir. 1943) (holding that the surviving
1992l
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Although the dichotomy between the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in New Colonial Ice and Metropolitan Edison remained, lower
courts continued to apply the "entity approach" set forth in New
Colonial Ice in non-merger cases." The Tax Court's decision in
Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissione?5 represents one of the most
egregious examples of a strict application of the entity approach.
In Alprosa Watch, two individuals purchased all of the stock of
Esspi Glove Corporation ("Esspi"), a company which manufactured
and sold women's gloves, planning to use Esspi as a vehicle
through which to sell imported watches. The day after the stock
purchase, the new shareholders changed the corporation's name
to Alprosa Watch Corporation ("Alprosa"), moved its place of
business, discontinued the glove business, and began to sell jewel-
ry, including watches. Shortly thereafter, the shareholders sold the
assets of the glove manufacturing operation back to the former
shareholders of the corporation.
46
Prior to the acquisition, Esspi had accumulated unused net
operating losses and excess profits credits that Alprosa wanted to
use to offset the income generated after the acquisition. The Tax
Court faced the issue of whether Esspi and Alprosa were, in fact,
the same corporate entity so that Alprosa could utilize the pre-
acquisition net operating losses and credits incurred by Esspi. The
court found that the corporation was the same legal entity for tax
purposes, even though it had changed its name, business location,
stock ownership, and the nature of its business. Accordingly, the
Tax Court permitted Alprosa to offset its post-acquisition income
with the net operating losses and unused excess profits credits
generated by Esspi prior to the acquisition.4 7 The Tax Court's
holding in Alprosa Watch carried the entity theory enunciated in
New Colonial Ice too far by elevating form over substance and mak-
corporation in a statutory merger was not entitled to use the merged corporation's un-
used dividend-paid credits following the merger; only the taxpayer to whom a deduction
accrues has the right to claim such deduction).
44 See Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Weber Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 764, 764
(10th Cir. 1936); Shreveport Producing & Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 972, 972
(5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 293 U.S. 616 (1934).
45 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
46 Id. at 242.
47 Id. at 246. In reaching its determination, the Tax Court rejected the argument
that the acquisition was made solely to evade federal income taxes, citing a valid business
purpose for the transaction. Thus, the court found the case of Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935), inapplicable. Alprosa Walch, 11 T.C. at 244-45.
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ing it relatively easy for a profitable corporation to "purchase" a
loss corporation's unused net operating losses.
48
The final judicial attempt to limit the free transferability of
net operating losses prior to the application of the 1954 Code
came in the landmark Supreme Court case of Libson Shops, Inc. v.
Koehler 9 In Libson Shops, the Court moved away from its analyses
in New Colonial Ice and Metropolitan Edison and instead adopted a
new standard for limiting the use of a corporation's net operating
losses. Libson Shops involved sixteen separate corporations that
operated women's retail clothing stores. A seventeenth corporation
provided management services to each of the sixteen retail stores,
and all seventeen corporations were commonly owned. Only three
of the retail clothing stores operated at a loss. In' 1949, the sixteen
sales corporations were merged into the management corporation
pursuant to state law, apparently for valid business reasons.50 The
surviving corporation attempted to offset its post-merger income
with the loss carryovers sustained by the three sales corporations
that were unprofitable prior to the merger.
Relying on New Colonial Ice, the Commissioner disallowed the
deduction because the surviving corporation was not the same
"taxpayer" as the merged corporations that had sustained the
losses.5 ' Libson Shops took the position that, as the surviving
corporation in a statutory merger, it should be treated as the same
legal entity as the merged corporations, citing Metropolitan Edison
in support of its position.52 Apparently rejecting the dichotomy
between the entity approach developed in New Colonial Ice and the
merger approach developed in Metropolitan Edison, the Supreme
Court instead adopted a new "continuity-of-business-enterprise"
48 One commentator observed that even though Alprosa Watch carried the holding of
New Colonial Ice "to a logical extreme," it was interesting that the Tax Court did not cite
New Colonial Ice anywhere in its opinion. Daniel Q. Posin, Three Strikes Are We Out? Trans-
fer of Loss Canyovers After the 1986 Act, 7 VA. TAX REV. 697, 712-13 n.58 (1988).
49 353 U.S. 382 (1957). Although Libson Shops was decided after the enactment of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. I (repealed
1986), the events giving rise to the case occurred prior to 1954; hence, the case was
governed by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, Pub. L. No. 1, 53 Stat. 1 (re-
pealed 1954). For a discussion of the provisions limiting the free transferability of net
operating losses under the 1954 Co4e, see infra notes 64-107 and accompanying text.
50 While the Supreme Court's opinion does not disclose the reason for the merger,
its holding that the "principal purpose" of the merger was not tax evasion implies that a
valid business purpose existed. Libson Shops, 353 U.S. at 389.
51 Id- at 385-86.
52 Id. at 386.
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test.5 3 Using this test, the Supreme Court held that the surviving
corporation could not succeed to the prior entities' tax attributes
because the surviving corporation was not substantially the same
business as the entities that had produced the losses.54
Libson Shops provided the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts with a powerful tool to prevent the transfer of net operat-
ing losses between taxpayers. Although the case was decided under
the provisions of the 1939 Code, some courts ruled that Libson
Shops' continuity-of-business-enterprise doctrine remained viable
even after the 1954 Code.5 5
53 The continuity-of-business-enterprise" concept was actually not new to the tax law.
It had come into existence much earlier in connection with tax-free reorganizations un-
der § 368 of the Code. See BrrTKER & EUsTICE, supra note 39, at 14-171 to 14-174. Libson
Shops was merely the first instance in which the Sulpreme Court employed a continuity-of-
business-enterprise test to disallow a taxpayer's use of its predecessor's net operating loss-
es.
54 Libson Shops, 353 U.S. at 389-90. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the net
operating loss carryover provisions was to:
ameliorate the unduly drastic consequences of taxing income strictly on an annu-
al basis. They were designed to permit a taxpayer to setoff its lean years against
its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income computed
over a period longer than one year. There is, however, no indication in their
legislative history that these provisions were designed to permit the averaging of
the pre-merger losses of one business with the post-merger income of some
other business which had been operated and taxed separately before the merger.
What history there is suggests that Congress primarily was concerned with the
fluctuating income of a single business.
Id. at 386-87 (footnotes omitted). Because the three corporations that had incurred the
net operating losses prior to the merger remained unprofitable as divisions following the
merger, it was apparent that the surviving corporation was attempting to offset post-merg-
er profits attributable to its other successful divisions against pre-merger net operating
losses of its loss constituents. Accordingly, the Court held that the income and losses
were not produced by substantially the same businesses and disallowed the deduction. Id.
at 390.
55 Compare United States v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc., 400 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1968)
(agreeing with the trial court that "in enacting sections 381 and 382 of the 1954 Code,
Congress intended to substitute statutory rules for court-made law and the precedential
value of the Libson Shops decision has been destroyed") and Maxwell Hardware Co. v.
Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1965) ("[b]y enacting the 1954 Code, Con-
gress destroyed the precedential value of the rule of decision of Libson Shops") with Na-
tional Tea Co. & Consol. Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 8, 19 (1984) ("we are
not prepared to accept petitioner's argument that Libson Shops has no application under
the 1954 Code"). See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON COR-
PORATE DISTRIBUTIONS, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-SUBCHAPTER C 204 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter ALl SUBCHAPTER C PROJECT].
The Libson Shops doctrine continued to be invoked, with varying degrees of success,
until 1986, when Congress made clear its intention to lay it to rest in. the legislative his-
tory of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
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2. Early Statutory Limitations on the Free Transferability of Net
Operating Losses
In 1943, Congress entered the fray by adding section 129 to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.56 Congress enacted section
129 in order to provide statutory limitations on the transferability
of certain deductions and tax credits." Specifically, the section
was intended to prevent trafficking in the net operating loss de-
duction. 8
Section 129 applied to certain stock or asset acquisitions" if
the "principal purpose" of the acquisition was the evasion or avoid-
ance of federal income tax through the use of a deduction, credit,
or other allowance that the acquiring party would not otherwise
enjoy.' If section 129 applied to an acquisition, the Commission-
er would disallow the tax benefit.6'
Although Congress purposely left the provisions of section 129
very broad in order to cover all forms of tax avoidance
2, at 194 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4077, 4282 ("[t]he conferees intend ...
that the Libson Shops doctrine will have no application to transactions subject to the pro-
visions of the conference agreement [the Tax Reform Act of 1986]").
56 Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, ch. 63, § 129, 58 Stat. 21, 47 (1944)
(recodified as § 269 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
57 See infra note 58.
58 H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943) ("[t]his section is designed to
put an end promptly to any market for, or dealings in, interests in corporations or
property which have as their objective the reduction through artifice of the income or
excess profits tax liability"); see also S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943)
("[t]he objective of the section . . . is to prevent the distortion through tax avoidance of
the deduction, credit, or allowance provisions of the code, particularly those of the type
represented by the recently developed practice of corporations with large excess profits
(or the interests controlling such corporations) acquiring corporations with current, past,
or prospective losses or deductions, deficits, or current or unused excess profits credits,
for the purpose of reducing income and excess profits taxes"). Section 129 was the pre-
decessor to § 269 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See infra notes 68-73 and ac-
companying text.
59 In a stock acquisition, § 129 applied to any person or persons who" acquired
control of a corporation, directly or indirectly. 'See § 129, 58 Stat. at 47. Control was
defined in section 129(a) as stock possessing at least 50% of the acquired corporation's
total voting stock or at least 50% of the total value of all shares of the acquired
corporation's stock. Id. The section also applied to an asset acquisition in which a cor-
poration acquired property of another corporation, which the acquiring corporation did
not control prior to the acquisition and in which the acquiring corporation took a trans-
ferred basis. Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. The statute further gave the Internal Revenue Service broad discretion to
allow a partial deduction, credit, or other tax benefit for that part of the transaction that
did not constitute tax avoidance. See § 129(b)(1), 58 Stat. at 48.
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schemes,62 the section nevertheless proved largely ineffectual be-
cause it was virtually impossible for the Internal Revenue Service
to prove that the taxpayer's "principal purpose" behind an acquisi-
tion was the avoidance of federal income taxes. As long as the
taxpayer had a substantial business purpose for entering into the
transaction, section 129 did not apply.
6 3
B. Net Operating Loss Carryovers Under the 1954 Code:
Congress Imposes Objective and Subjective
Limitations on Net Operating Loss Transfers
The limited success of the Internal Revenue Service in pre-
venting the free transferability of net operating loss carryovers led
Congress to enact a comprehensive statutory scheme restricting
the use of net operating loss carryovers in certain transactions.'
62 See supra note 58.
63 See, e.g., WAGE, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 249, 256 (1952); Alcorn Wholesale
Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 75, 89 (1951); Berland's Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 182,
188 (1951); Commodores Point Terminal Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 411, 417
(1948). It is interesting to note that the original version of § 129 proposed by the House
suggested that the section was applicable any time that one of the principal purposes of
the transaction was to avoid taxes. Conversely, the Senate- version of § 129 made it clear
that "principal purpose" meant that the tax avoidance purpose had to outrank or exceed
in importance any other purpose for the transaction. The Senate's version of § 129 was
ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee and proved to be the downfall of that
provision. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1944).
Although the "principal purpose" standard of § 129 remained unchanged, the Ser-
vice began to enjoy some success in its challenges under § 129 in 1957. Previously, courts
had placed the burden on the Service to prove that the principal purpose of an acquisi-
tion was to avoid taxes. If the taxpayer could show a valid business purpose for the
transaction, the Service failed to carry its burden. In 1957, however, the Ninth Circuit, in
American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125, 126-27 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957), shifted the initial burden to the taxpayer to demonstrate a
"substantial" business purpose for the acquisition. Taxpayers found it virtually impossible
to discharge this burden successfully, particularly where the taxpayer had acquired a loss
corporation. See, e.g., Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distrib., Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th
Cir. 1960); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 816 (1959). Although each of the foregoing cases in which the Service successfully
invoked § 129 to disallow the transfer of net operating losses between taxpayers was de-
cided after the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all of the cases involve
tax years prior to 1954. Accordingly, § 129 of the 1939 Code, and not § 269 of the 1954
Code, discussed infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text, was applicable.
64 H.R REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017, 4067. According to the legislative history to the 1954 Code, Congress established a
comprehensive scheme largely in response to the myriad legislative and judicial tests that
had developed over the years, many of which were nebulous and inconsistent. Id.; S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 284-86 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
4922-25. As one commentator aptly described,
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As part of the 1954 Code, Congress adopted a twofold approach
aimed at eliminating the perceived abuse of trafficking in net
operating losses. First, it retained the subjective "tax- avoidance"
test of section 129 of the 1939 Code, recodifying it as section 269
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.' Second, it developed an
objective test for limiting the use of a corporation's net operating
losses following certain prescribed changes in the ownership of
such corporation." Although the subjective test of section 269
enabled the Service to' limit net operating loss transfers in the
most egregious cases, the objective test of section 382 proved
more successful in limiting such transfers.
6 7
1. Section 269 of the 1954 Code
Section 269 of the 1954 Code recodified the subjective tax
avoidance test enunciated in section 129 of the 1939 Code, but
added one important subsection in an attempt to ease the burden
placed on the Commissioner to demonstrate a tax avoidance mo-
tive. Section 269(c) established a presumption of tax avoidance in
cases where the purchase price paid for a corporation by an ac-
quiring party was substantially disproportionate to the aggregate of
the total adjusted bases of the properties acquired plus the tax
benefits available as a result of the acquisition.' The primary ef-
fect of this presumption was to impose upon the acquiring corpo-
ration the burden of proving that it did not have a tax avoidance
motive.' Thus, under the presumption established in section
prior to enactment of the 1954 Code, the question of whether a net operating
loss deduction survived a corporate change of ownership turned upon at least
three very different standards: the "entity" approach of New Colonial Ice, as modi-
fied by Metropolitan Edison; the statutory "tax avoidance" test; and the "business
continuity" requirement of Libson Shops.
Yin, supra note 25, at 41-6.
65 I.R.C. § 269 (1954) (amended 1963, 1983, and 1988); see infra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text.
66 I.RIC. § 382 (1954) (amended 1964, 1976, 1980, 1981, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988,
and 1989); see infra notes 74-107 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 68-107 and accompanying text.
68 I.R.C. § 269(c) (1954) (repealed 1976).
69 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017, 4057, states that § 269(c)
has the effect of throwing on the corporation the burden of proving that there
was no purpose of evasion or avoidance in cases where the consideration paid in
acquiring control of another corporation, or corporation property, is substantially
disproportionate to the sum of the adjusted basis of the property and the tax
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269(c), an acquiring party could only use the acquired
corporation's net operating losses and other tax benefits if it paid
for them.
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the presumption
embodied in section 269(c) ran contrary to its intended purpose,
largely because "tax avoidance motives would be more apt to be
present where the value of 'tax benefits' was paid for, than they
would be where the 'tax benefits' were not given weight."70  Ac-
cordingly, the presumption received little favor in the courts,
71
and Congress eventually repealed it in 1976.72 Section 269 was
not amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and remains in
effect today.73
benefits not otherwise available.
Id.
70 See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1976), Y4printed in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3274; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 497-98 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3922-23.
71 See, e.g., Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 1, 16 (1972); Industrial
Suppliers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 635, 645-46 (1968); H.F. Ramsey Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 500, 517 (1965).
72 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(38), 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(90 Stat.) 1520, 1771 (codified at I.R.C. § 269 (1988)).
73 See I.R.C. § 269 (1988). Some factors that have been considered in determining
whether the tax avoidance motive required by § 269 is present include: (1) whether the
parties knew of the existence of the acquired corporation's favorable tax benefits when
they entered into the transaction; (2) whether the corporation being acquired was a
viable business and would continue to be following the acquisition, or whether it was
instead merely a corporate shell; (3) whether acquiring the target corporation would
enhance the business activities of the acquiring corporation, either by moving into new
markets or by diversifying its business or investment portfolio; (4) the value of the tax
benefits being acquired as a percentage of the value of the business being acquired (de-
termined by its earning potential); (5) whether the tax benefits would have been avail-
able to the acquirer even in the absence of the acquisition; and (6) whether the form of
the acquisition (either a stock purchase rather than an asset purchase or a nontaxable
reorganization rather than a taxable acquisition) was mandated by business considerations
apart from tax implications. BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 39, at 16-44 to 16-45, and
cases cited therein. For a recent case applying these factors to a § 269 determination,
see In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 962 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), in which
the bankruptcy court found that Federated acquired all of the outstanding stock of Twin
Fairs Distributors Corporation and over twenty-six million dollars in Twin Fairs' net oper-
ating losses for the principal purpose of business expansion, and not tax avoidance. Id. at
970. Thus, the court refused to apply § 269 to disallow Federated's post-acquisition use
of the net operating losses generated by Twin Fairs before the acquisition. Id. at 972.
As discussed infra notes 209-16 and accompanyirig text, § 269 has taken on new
importance in connection with transactions involving the attempted transfer of net operat-
ing losses of a bankrupt corporation in a Title 11 proceeding.
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2. Sections 381 and 382 of the 1954 Code
In addition to the subjective tax avoidance test of section 269,
the comprehensive scheme enacted by Congress in 1954 included
dual provisions designed to establish objective guidelines governing
the transactions in which an acquiring corporation could succeed
to the tax attributes of an acquired corporation (section 381), as
well as provisions- for limiting the transferability of net operating
losses upon the occurrence of certain prescribed events (section
382). First, section 381 of the 1954 Code allowed an acquiring
corporation to succeed to the net operating losses and other tax
attributes74 of another corporation acquired either (1) in a tax-
free asset acquisition; or (2) in a tax-free liquidation of an eighty-
percent-owned subsidiary.7 In enacting section 381, Congress re-
jected the entity approach enunciated in New Colonial Ice--that is,
that the only way in which to preserve a loss corporation's net
operating losses was to continue that corporation's legal identi-
ty- 6 By allowing net operating losses to be passed from one cor-
74 Although the net operating loss carryover is one significant tax attribute governed
by § 381, the current version of that provision lists no less than 21 tax attributes that
survive a tax-free reorganization or liquidation, including earnings and profits, capital loss
carryovers, accounting methods, and excess charitable contributions. Se I.R.C. §
381(c)(1)-(25) (West Supp. 1992).
75 I.RIC. § 381(a) (1954). Thus, § 381(a) applies in a liquidation of a controlled
subsidiary governed by § 332 as well as a reorganization meeting the requirements of §
368(a)(1)(A), (C), (D), (F), or (G). See I.R.C. § 381(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Section 381 has
survived numerous revisions to the Code with only minor amendments, such as adding G
reorganizations, those involving corporations in Title 11 proceedings, to its list of tax-free
asset reorganizations. See Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 4(g), 94
Stat. 3389, 3404 (1980); see also infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
Congress also amended § 381 several times to expand the list of tax attributes gov-
erned by its provisions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Sta.
2320, 2321 (1986); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 208,
221(b)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 226, 246 (1981); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
1601(e), 90 Stat. 1520, 1746 (1976); Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-69, § 3(c), 73 Stat. 112, 139 (1959). For a detailed discussion of the technical
rules involving the operation of § 381, see BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 39, at 16-15 to
16-34; Posin, supra note 48, at 705-11.
76 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017, 4066-67; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4683-84. The legislative history generally provides that a decision as to
whether a net operating loss carryover will be permitted:
should be based upon economic realities rather than upon artificialities as the
legal form of the reorganization.
The new rules enable the successor corporation to step into the "tax
shoes" of its predecessor corporation without necessarily conforming to artificial
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poration to another in certain tax-free reorganizations and liquida-
tions, Congress reestablished the net operating loss carryover as a
valuable commodity. As one commentator explained, "section 381
deviates from the pure averaging rationale for loss carryovers and
instead follows a policy that allows loss corporation shareholders to
recoup a portion of their losses in the form of consideration for
the loss carryover. As a result, net operating loss carryovers be-
came a marketable corporate asset.
" 77
Recognizing that section 381 provided an incentive for profit-
able corporations to purchase loss corporations in order to suc-
ceed to their net operating losses, Congress also enacted section
382 as part of the 1954 Code in order to limit the transferability
of net operating losses in certain corporate transactions. 7 Section
382 contained two objective standards governing the reduction of
net operating losses: section 382(a) applied to taxable acquisitions
while section 382(b) applied to nontaxable reorganizations. Under
section 382(a), a corporation's net operating losses were eliminat-
ed completely if two circumstances were present. First, the corpo-
ration must have experienced a change in the control of its
stock.7 9 The requisite change in control occurred if, at the end
of any taxable year of the loss corporation, the stock ownership of
its ten largest shareholders had increased by fifty percentage
points or more"° than their stock ownership at the beginning of
legal requirements which now exist under court-made law. Tax results of liquida-
tions or reorganizations are thereby made to depend less upon the form of the
transaction than upon the economic integration of two or more separate busi-
nesses into a unified business enterprise.
Id.; see also BrrrKER & EuSTIcE, supra note 39, at 16-19 ("The strict continuity of legal
entity approach with respect to the survival of corporate tax attributes, inspired by New
Colonial . . . was rejected by the drafters of the 1954 Code").
77 Simmons, supra note 25, at 1058.
78 See I.R.C. § 382 (1954); see also H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4067 (providing that "[t]his special limitation
on net operating loss carryovers provides an objective standard governing the availability
of a major tax benefit which has been abused through trafficking in corporations with
operating loss carryovers, .the tax benefits of which are exploited by persons other than
those who incurred the loss.").
79 I.R.C. § 382(a)(1) (1954) (amended 1976, 1978, and 1986).
80 A fifty percentage point increase in stockholdings is not the same as a fifty percent
increase. Consider, for example, a shareholder owning 10 shares out of 100 outstanding
shares of stock (a 10% shareholder). If his stock ownership increased to 15 shares, he
would have experienced a fifty percent increase in his holdings, but only a five percent-
age point increase. In order to meet § 382(a)'s change-of-control test, the shareholder
would have to increase from 10 shares to 60 shares. This concept of percentage point
increases carries into the post-1986 version of § 382 as well. See infra notes 156-59 and
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the taxable year or at the beginning of the prior taxable year,1
and the new stock had been acquired in a taxable transaction (the
"change-of-control" test),.2 Second, the corporation must have
failed to carry on a trade or business substantially similar to the
business conducted by it before the change in control occurred
(the "continuity-of-business" test),.
Because the change-of-control test contained in the first prong
of section 382(a) was fairly mechanical in operation, the Service
had little trouble applying it in practice. On the other hand, the
second prong of section 382(a), the continuity-of-business test,
provided both the Service and taxpayers more difficulty. The Ser-
vice took a strict view of this continuity-of-business requirement,
providing in regulations that a corporation would not be deemed
to carry on substantially the same business if it discontinued "more
than a minor portion" of the business that it carried on before
the change in control occurred." Furthermore, under the regu-
lations, if the corporation changed its location following the
change in control, the corporation would fail the continuity-of-
business test if the location change altered its business in any
significant way. 5 Despite the Service's strict interpretation of the
continuity-of-business requirement, many courts adopted a more
lenient interpretation of the statutory requirement.86
accompanying text.
81 I.R.C. § 382(a) (1) (A) (1954) (amended 1976, 1978, and 1986). For purposes of
determining control, stock ownership percentages were calculated based upon the fair
market value of the corporation's outstanding stock, rather than on the basis of the
outstanding number of shares. Id. Moreover, the constructive ownership rules of § 318(a)
applied in determining stock ownership for this purpose. See I.RC. § 382(a)(3) (1954)
'(amended 1976, 1978, and 1986).
82 A taxable transaction would occur if either th6 stock was acquired by purchase,
defined as a transaction in which the acquirer received a cost basis in the stock, or by
reason of a stock redemption. See I.R.C. § 382(a)(1)(B), (a)(4) (1954) (for full text see
COMPLETE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 25,345-46 n.§ 382 (Apr. 2, 1980 ed.,
Prentice-Hall, Inc.)).
83 I.R.C. § 382(a)(1)(C) (1954) (for full text see COMPLETE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954 25,345-46 n.§ 382 (Apr. 2, 1980 ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc.)).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l (h) (7) (1963). In determining whether the discontinuance
constituted "more than a minor portion" of the loss corporation's business, the regula-
tions provided that weight would be given to whether the discontinuance had the effect
of enabling a corporation to utilize loss carryovers to offset income of a business other
than that business which produced the losses. Id.
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(9) (1963). Some items taken into account under the
regulations included whether the business's employees, equipment, customers, and histori-
cal geographical areas were changed as a result of the relocation. Id.; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.382(a)-l(h)(5) (1963).
86 For example, one court allowed a purchaser to retain the acquired corporation's
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While section 382(a) applied to taxable acquisitions, such as
stock purchases and redemptions, section 382(b) sought to impose
limitations on the transferability of net operating loss carryovers in
certain nontaxable transactions, such as tax-free asset reorganiza-
tions."7 Generally, when a corporation acquires the assets and
business of a loss corporation in a tax-free reorganization, it suc-
ceeds to that corporation's net operating losses and other tax
attributes under section 381 (a) of the Code. As originally enacted
in 1954, however, section 382(b) required the reduction of a loss
corporation's net operating losses otherwise available as carryovers
to an acquiring corporation if the shareholders of the loss corpo-
ration immediately before the reorganization owned less than
twenty percent of the outstanding stock of the acquiring corpora-
tion after the reorganization.8s  In such a case, the loss
corporation's net operating losses were reduced by five percent for
each one percent less than the requisite twenty-percent minimum
owned by the loss corporation's shareholders. For example, if the
shareholders of the loss corporation owned only twelve percent of
the acquiring corporation following the reorganization, the
corporation's net operating losses would be reduced by forty per-
cent (five percent times eight).9 Thus, section 382(b) was specifi-
cally designed to address trafficking in a loss corporation's net
operating losses by profitable corporations. 90
Soon after section 382 was enacted in 1954, it became appar-
ent that it was inadequate in several respects. First, section 382 was
difficult to justify from a policy standpoint. The most significant
net operating losses despite the fact that the corporation's business location was changed
after the purchase, a new line of business was added, and the corporation's historical em-
ployees were replaced with new ones. See Commissioner v. Goodwin Crockery Co., 37
T.C. 355, 363-64, affid, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963). For other cases adopting the more
lenient approach to the continuity-of-business test, see. Koppers Co. v. United States, 229
F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Pa. 1964); H.F. Ramsey Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 500 (1965).
87 I.R.C. § 382(b) (1954) (amended 1976, 1978, 1984, and 1986).
88 The calculation of stock ownership for purposes of the twenty-percent test was
based on the fair market value of the acquiring corporation's outstanding stock. See I.R.C.
§ 382(b) (1) (B) (1954). Moreover, under the original version of § 382(b) enacted in
1954, only those reorganizations qualifying under § 368(a) as A, C, D, or F reorganiza-
tions were within the purview of § 382(b). So-called G reorganizations, those involving a
corporation reorganizing in a Title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, were later added to the
class of reorganizations governed by § 382(b). See Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-589, § 4(g), 94 Stat. 3404 (1980); see also infra notes 121-30 and accompanying
text.
89 I.R.C. § 382(b)(2) (1954).
90 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4924.
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problem was that section 382 produced wildly divergent tax results
based solely 'upon whether a transaction took the form of a tax-
able purchase or a tax-free reorganization, with no readily ascer-
tainable policy justification for such inconsistent results." For ex-
ample,, even if nearly all of a loss corporation's stock changed
hands, the corporation would still be entitled to retain all of its
net operating loss carryovers if it carried on substantially the same
business after the change in control, and the new shareholders
obtained their stock in taxable transactions. The corporation's net
operating losses would be reduced dramatically, however, if the
change in control occurred as a result of. a tax-free asset reorgani-
92zation.
On the other hand, tax-free reorganizations received more
favorable treatment in certain respects. For example, Congress
imposed only a twenty percent continuity-of-interest requirement
for a tax-free reorganization, whereas it imposed a fifty percent
continuity-of-interest requirement for taxable purchases.' Similar-
ly, net operating loss carryovers were eliminated entirely if the
purchase limitations of section 382(a) applied, but were only re-
duced proportionately if the reorganization rules came into
play.9
4
Section 382 suffered from several technical defects as well. For
example, so-called B reorganizations,95 those involving a tax-free
exchange of stock for stock, were not subject to either type of
limitation.96 Because such reorganizations were nontaxable trans-
actions, section 382(a), which involved only taxable purchases, did
not apply. Section 382(b) also did not apply because, by its terms,
it was only applicable to asset reorganizations and not stock reor-
ganizations. Thus, a profitable corporation could exchange a por-
tion of its stock for stock of a loss corporation, wait a reasonable
91 See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 202 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3633-34; Posin, supra note 48, at 716.
92 See Yin, supra note 25, at 41-7 to 41-8. The author suggests that one example of
how this nearly complete 'elimination of NOLs could occur is if a "loss corporation
'minnow' were swallowed by a profitable 'whale,' with former shareholders of the loss
corporation obtaining stock in the acquiring corporation representing only a tiny percent-
age of its total outstanding stock." Id. at 41-8 n.20.
93 S. REP. No. 938, supra note 91, at 202, repTinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3634.
94 Id; see also Yin, supra note 25, at 41-8.
95 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1988).
96 STAFF OF SENATE FIN. COMM., 99TH CONG., 1sT SEss., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION
AcT OF 1985, at 34 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL RE-
PORT].
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period of time before liquidating the loss corporation, and then
succeed to the loss corporation's net operating loss carryovers
without being subject to any of the section 382 limitations. 7
Another technical defect inherent in section 382(b) was its
inability to limit the transferability of net operating losses in, a
triangular reorganization. In a triangular reorganization, a parent
corporation would establish a subsidiary, or use an existing subsid-
iary, to acquire a loss corporation. As part of the merger of the
loss corporation into the subsidiary, the loss corporation's share-
holders would receive stock of the parent corporation. Pursuant to
section 382(b)(6), however, the twenty-percent minimum owner-
ship provision was determined by treating the loss corporation's
former shareholders as having received stock of the subsidiary
equal in value to the stock that they actually received in the par-
ent corporation. 98 This provision allowed large corporations to
succeed to the net operating loss carryovers of small corporations
through the use of a triangular reorganization that left the ac-
quired corporation's shareholders with only a tiny percentage of
the large corporation's stock. Accordingly, section 382(b)(6) af-
forded taxpayers the ability to circumvent the limitations of sec-
tion 382(b) and encouraged trafficking in net operating losses.9
Finally, many commentators criticized the continuity-of-busi-
ness requirement on the grounds that it ran contrary to sound
business judgment because it required an unprofitable business to
remain intact simply for tax purposes."° Moreover, the continu-
ity-of-business requirement was difficult to apply in practice be-
cause it required a case-by-case analysis, thereby converting the
97 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 938, supra note 91, at 202, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3634. However, if an acquiring corporation engaged in a B reorganization and followed it
promptly by a liquidation of the acquired corporation, both courts and the Service
treated it as a C reorganization, governed by the limitations of § 382(b). See, e.g., Resorts
Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-
1(a) (6) (1963); Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141. Some commentators also believed that
transactions falling within the purview of § 351, governing tax-free incorporations, also
fell outside the purview of both the section 382(a) and (b) limitations. See Yin, supra
note 25, at 41-8.
98 I.R.C. § 382(b)(6) (1954).
99 See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 91, at 202-03, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3633-34; Posin, supra note 48, at 718-19; Robert A. Rizzi, Section 382 and the Trigger Rules;
Is Congress Beating a Dead Horse?, 14 J. CORP. TAX'N 99, 107 (1987).
100 See SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 68-69; S. REP. No.
938, supra note 91, at 202, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3634; see also AMERICAN LAW
INST., FED. INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAx PROJECr-INCOME TAx PROBLEMS OF CORPS. AND
SHAREHOLDERS 339 (1958).
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purportedly objective test of section 382 into a subjective determi-
nation akin to that set forth in section 269.101
These internal inconsistencies and technical defects inherent
in the 1954 version of section 382 led Congress to overhaul the
provision completely as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.102
The 1976 Act changes sought to equalize the treatment of taxable
purchases and tax-free reorganizations involving loss corporations
by (1) eliminating the continuity-of-business requirement of sec-
tion 382(a); (2) raising the change-of-control test from fifty to
sixty percentage points, with a concomitant increase in the share-
holder continuity test of section 382(b) from twenty to forty per-
cent; and (3) replacing section 382(a)'s total net operating loss
disallowance provision with a proportionate reduction similar to
that set forth in section 382(b).0 Additionally, the 1976 Act at-
tempted to correct the technical defects inherent in the prior ver-
sion of section 382 by (1) treating section 351 transactions as
taxable purchases governed by section 382(a); (2) including B
reorganizations within the ambit of section 382(b); and (3) mea-
suring shareholder continuity-of-interest in triangular reorganiza-
101 Posin, sutpra note 48, at 717.
102 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(e), (g)(2), (3), 90 Star. 1520,
1599, 1604-05 (1976). It should also be noted that, prior to the proposed amendments to
§ 382 in 1976, the Treasury Department sought to limit the use of a corporation's net
operating losses in certain circumstances involving corporations filing consolidated tax re-
turns. In 1966, the Treasury piomulgated regulations that established the "separate return
limitation year" ("SRLY') and the "consolidated return change of ownership" ("CRCO")
limitations on the use of net operating losses of certain members of a consolidated
group of corporations. Under the SRLY rules, a new member joining a consolidated
group can generally use its losses incurred prior to joining the group to offset its own
income generated after joining the consolidated group, but cannot use its losses to offset
the income generated by other members of the group. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(f),
-15(a), -21(c) (1966). The CRCO rules provide that, if a common parent of a consolidat-
ed group undergoes a fifty percentage point change in the ownership of its stock within
a two-year period, losses generated by members of the group before the ownership
change can only be used to offset income generated by those same members after the
ownership change. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(g), -21(d) (1966).
On January 29, 1991, however, the Service promulgated proposed regulations de-
signed to repeal the CRCO limitations, as they applied to net operating and capital loss-
es, on a prospective basis. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(d)(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 4228
(1991). Although a detailed discussion of the SRLY and CRCO rules is beyond the scope
of this Article, see Faber, supra note 28, at 2-9 to 2-11 for an excellent discussion of the
SRLY rules, and Errol G. Golub, The NOL: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 45 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 2-1, 2-12 to 2-13 (1987), for a discussion of the CRCO rules.
103 I.R.C. § 382(a), (b) (1976) (repealed, 1986); see also BrITKER & EUSTICE, supra
note 39, at 16-54 to 16-55.
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tions by reference to the shareholders' interests in stock of the
parent, rather than that of the subsidiary.
1 1
4
Although the provisions of the 1976 Act remedied many per-
ceived deficiencies in section 382, the provisions were hastily draft-
ed and extraordinarily complex.105 Because a number of com-
mentators roundly criticized these provisions, and because they
were the subject of concerted lobbying efforts,'0 6 Congress post-
poned their effective date several times and eventually repealed
them retroactively as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.107
3. Amendments Made By the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
Although the courts and Congress had been imposing judicial
and statutory restrictions on the free transferability of net operat-
ing losses since 1934, it was not until 1980, two years after the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,' that Congress first afford-
ed special treatment to the net operating losses of corporations
seeking bankruptcy protection. In an effort to facilitate the reha-
bilitation of corporations attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy,
Congress enacted three new provisions as part of the Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1980: (1) a provision exempting corporations in Title
11 proceedings from the harsh application of certain discharge-of-
indebtedness rules;"t  (2) an insolvency reorganization
104 I.R.C. § 382(a), (b).
105 See Faber, supra note 28, at 2-18.
106 See Rizzi, supra note 99, at 108 n.42. -
107 The 1976 Act, as originally enacted, delayed the effective date of the § 382 provi-
sions until 1978. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(e), 90 Stat.
1520, 1606 (1976). Soon thereafter, Congress delayed the effective date of these provi-
sions until 1980. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 368, 92 Stat. 2763, 2857
(1978). The effective date of the provisions was again postponed until 1982 by the Fringe
Benefit Regulation-Issuance-Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 9(e), 93 Stat. 1275,
1279 (1979). The effective date of the provisions was then delayed until 1984 by the
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, § 111, 95 Stat. 1635, 1640
(1981), and the effective date was postponed for another two years by the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 62(b)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 583 (1984). The 1976 Act
provisions were finally repealed retroactively as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 621(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2266 (1986).
108 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
109 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat. 3389, 3389 (1980)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7017.
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provision;'10 and (3) an amendment to section 382(b) treating
creditors as shareholders in Title 11 proceedings."'
The Bankruptcy Tax Act contained extensive provisions deal-
ing with a corporation's indebtedness that is discharged in a Title
11 proceeding."2 Generally, when a taxpayer's debt is discharged
for less than its face amount,* the taxpayer must include that dif-
ference in gross income as discharge-of-indebtedness income."'
Under the Bankruptcy Tax Act, however, a corporate taxpayer
involved in a Title 11 proceeding did not have to include the
discharge-of-indebtedness amount in its income," 4 as long as the
bankruptcy court approved the debt discharge."' In exchange
for this income exclusion, the Act required that the amount of
the discharged debt reduce the debtor corporation's tax attributes
in the following order: first, its net operating losses; second, cer-
tain tax credits, such as the general business credit; third, its capi-
tal loss carryovers; fourth, the basis of its assets; and fifth, its for-
eign tax credit carryovers (the "debt discharge rule")."' The Act
further provided that the debt discharge rule would not apply if
the debtor corporation issued stock in exchange for the debt dis-
charged.1 7 This provision codified a rule developed by an exten-
sive body of case law which had come to be known as the stock-
for-debt exception.' The stock-for-debt exception applied re-
110 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, § 4(a), 94 Stat. at 3401 (codified in 26 U.S.C. §
368(a)); see also S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7049.
111 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, § 2(d), 94 Stat. at 3396 (codified in 26 U.S.C. §
382(b) (7) (repealed 1986)); 'see also S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 38, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7052.
112 The provisions also encompassed taxpayers other than corporations and, in addi-
tion, included debtors that were insolvent but not involved in a Title 11 proceeding. The
remainder of this discussion, however, will focus on corporations in Title 11 proceedings.
113 I.RC. § 61(a)(12) (1988); see also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1
(1931).
114 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, § 2, 94 Stat. at 3389; I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (1988).
115 I.R.C. § 108(d)(2) (1988).
116 I.R.C. § 108(b) (1988). Alternatively, a corporation could choose to preserve its
net operating losses and other tax attributes by electing instead to reduce the basis in its
depreciable assets and certain of its other property. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(5) (1988). In
deciding whether to make this election, a corporation would need to take into account
§ 1017(b)(2), which limits the basis reduction under the ordering rules to the outstand-
ing liabilities of the corporation following the debt discharge, but does not limit basis re-
duction where a corporation elects to reduce depreciable assets instead of following the
ordering rules. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2) (1988).
117 See I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (West Supp. 1992).
118 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 125-26 (1st Cir. 1946);
Capento Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), aftd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.
1992]
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gardless of whether the issued stock had a fair market value less
than the face amount of the debt discharged." 9 The exception
applied, however, only when the value of the stock issued in ex-
change for the debt was more than "nominal or token." 2 ' Both
the exception to the income-from-discharge-of-indebtedness provi-
sion and the codification of the stock-for-debt exception greatly
assisted corporations attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy.
In addition, the Bankruptcy Tax Act added a new insolvency
reorganization provision to the Code. The type G reorganiza-
tion authorized by the 'provision allowed a corporation in a
Title 11 or similar proceeding 22 to reorganize on a tax-free basis
without having to meet the stringent requirements applicable to
other types of tax-free reorganizations. 2  For example, in enact-
ing the type G reorganization provisions, Congress eliminated the
requirement that the reorganization comply with state merger
1944).
119 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 168 (Comm. Print 1984).
120 I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) (West Supp. 1992). The "nominal or token" concept was not
defined by statute, and practitioners struggled for years to ascertain a reasonable defi-
nition of the term. Finally, on December 7, 1990, the Internal Revenue Service issued
regulations under § 108 that provided rules for determining whether stock issued in ex-
change for debt is "nominal or token." See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 55 Fed. Reg.
50568-01 (1990). For a discussion of these "de minimis" rules, see Stefan R. Boshkov,
Selected Federal Income Tax Consequences of Restructuring Debt of Failing Corporations After the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, 69 TAXES 214, 221-23 (1991); Seth M. Zachary & Jill
Greenwald, An Analysis of the Stock-For-Debt Exception to Cancellation of Indebtedness Income, 18
J. CoRP. TAX'N 144, 149-54 (1991).
It should be noted that the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), contained several rules dealing with the discharge-of-
indebtedness provisions of § 108. For example, the 1990 Act provided that the stock-for-
debt exception would no longer apply when "disqualified stock," as defined in the Act,
was issued in exchange for debt. For a discussion of the 1990 Act provisions, see Andrew
N. Berg, Corporate Debt Restructurings After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, 18 J. CORP.
TAx'N 124 (1991); Timothy C. Sherck, Restructuring Today's Financially Troubled Corporation,
68 TAXES 881 (1990).
121 The G reorganization is found in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G) (1988), which defines a
type G reorganization as:
a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation in
a title 11 or similar case; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or secu-
rities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a
transaction which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356.
Id.
122 The Act defines a similar proceeding as "a receivership, foreclosure, or similar
proceeding in a Federal or State court." I.R.C. § 368(a) (3) (A) (1988).
123 S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7049.
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laws, as was requiied in type A reorganizations. 124 The new provi-
sions also eliminated the requirement that the troubled corpora-
tion receive only stock of the acquiring corporation in an asset
exchange, as was required in type C reorganizations. 125 More-
over,, the judicially-created continuity-of-interest requirement im-
posed on tax-free reorganizations generally126 was eased consid-
erably for G reorganizations. 27 Accordingly, under the new G
reorganization provisions, either an asset transfer or an exchange
of stock and securities conducted in accordance with a reorgani-
zation plan approved by a court could constitute a tax-free reorga-
nization. l
8
Congress also provided that the net operating losses and oth-
er tax attributes of a financially troubled corporation would carry
over to the acquiring corporation in a G reorganization pursuant
to section 381 of the Code. 29 Furthermore, it added the G reor-
ganization to the list of tax-free reorganizations subject to the
limitations imposed by section 382(b). 1 °
Although the most significant contribution of the Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1980 was arguably the creation of the G reorganization
provisions, it also contained an amendment to section 382(b) that
was designed to protect a financially troubled corporation's net
operating losses in a bankruptcy reorganization. In theory, adding
G reorganizations to the list of tax-free reorganizations governed
by section 382(b) ensured that shareholders need only retain
twenty percent of the loss corporation's stock in order to preserve
its net operating losses after bankruptcy.'5 ' In practice, however,
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, (1940); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1932), cert. dened, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). For an outstanding discussion of the
evolution of the continuity-of-interest doctrine, see BrrrKER & EUsTICE, supra note 39, at
14-17 to 14-31.
127 S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 36, rerinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7050;-see.
also BrrrKER & EusTiCE, supra note 39, at 14-102 to 14-103. For a detailed discussion of
the application of the continuity-of-interest rules to G reorganizations, see Paul H. Asofsky
& William Tatlock, Reorganizations, Procedures and Corporate Taxes Greatly Affected by Bankrupt-
cy Tax Act, 54 J. TAX'N 170, 171 (1981).
128 BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 39, at 14-103.
129 The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 4(g), 94 Stat. 3389, 3404
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), amended section 381(a)(2) to
include G reorganizations in its list of tax-free asset reorganizations. See supra note 75
and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
131 I.R.C. § 382(b) (1954) (amended 1976, 1978, 1984, and 1986); see also supra notes
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the shareholders of a corporation in a Chapter 11 proceeding
often retained little, if any, of the reorganized corporation's stock,
thereby decreasing the availability of the loss corporation's net
operating losses following insolvency reorganization. Congress,
apparently considering the realities of practice and recognizing
that a loss corporation's creditors were the true owners of a finan-
cially troubled corporation,' amended section 382(b) to in-
clude a provision that treated creditors as shareholders for purpos-
es of the twenty percent continuity-of-interest requirement of sec-
tion 382(b) in a Title 11 or similar proceeding. 3  That amend-
ment provided as follows:
(7) SPECIAL RULE FOR REORGANIZATIONS IN TITLE
11 OR SIMILAR CASES.-For purposes of this subsection, a
creditor who receives stock in a reorganization in a title 11 or
similar case (within the meaning of section 368(a)(3)(A)) shall
be treated as a stockholder immediately before the reorganiza-
tion. 14
Thus, a loss corporation could emerge from bankruptcy with all of
its net operating losses intact if its creditors and shareholders
together received at least twenty percent of the reorganized
corporation's stock in the bankruptcy proceeding. By providing a
loss corporation with a means by which to protect its net operat-
ing losses following an insolvency reorganization, Congress took
the first step toward ensuring the success of the newly enacted
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. 3 ' Unfortunately, just six
87-89 and accompanying text.
132 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 recognizes that creditors
are the true owners of a financially troubled corporation. The Senate Committee Report
states that "the most senior class of creditor to receive stock, together with all equal and
junior classes (including shareholders who receive any. consideration for their stock),
should generally be considered the proprietors of the insolvent corporation for
'continuity' purposes." S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 36-37, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7051. The Senate Report further cites the case of Helvering v. Alabama
Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942), which stands for the proposition that
creditors' interests in a loss corporation are proprietary interests for purposes of satisfying
the continuity-of-interest doctrine. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 109, at 33 n.1, repinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7048.
133 I.R.C. § 382(b)(7) (1980) (repealed 1986).
134 Id.
135 Congress took another step in the same direction when it amended § 382(b)
again in 1981 to provide that depositors in financially troubled thrift institutions be treat-
ed as shareholders for purposes of applying the 20% continuity-of-interest test. See The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 242, 95 Stat. 172, 255 (1981);
I.R.C. § 382(b)(7)(B)(i) (1981) (repealed 1986). A thrift institution included savings and
loan associations as well as savings banks. See JoiNT COMM. ON TAX'N, 99TH CONG., 1ST
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years later, Congress reversed that trend when it enacted the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
III. LIMITATIONS ON NET OPERATING Loss CARRYovERS
IMPOSED BY THE 1986 AcT
Shortly after section 382 was amended in 1976, it became
apparent that the 1976 version of the statute suffered from many
of the same defects as its predecessor.13 6 Due to widespread criti-
cism of the provision, the American Law Institute ("ALI") began
to study the treatment of net operating losses generally and to
analyze whether wholesale revision of section 382 v}as appropri-
ate.137 ALI released its findings in 1982 as part of its comprehen-
sive Federal Income Tax Project on Subchapter C.13 8 The ALI
study proposed an entirely new limitation on the free transfer-
ability of net operating losses. Under the ALI proposal, net operat-
ing losses would survive an acquisition transaction completely in-
tact; however, the amount of post-acquisition earnings that could
be offset by those loss carryovers would be limited to a certain
prescribed rate of return, based on the value of the loss corpora-
tion immediately before the acquisition." 9 The ALI proposal was
based upon a policy of tax neutrality."4 The proposal's underly-
SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 293 (Comm. Print
1987) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK].
136 The 1976 version of § 382, like the 1954 version, was uncertain in application,
largely because § 269 continued to overlap in some situations with the revised § 382
proposals. See ALI SUBCHAPTER C PROJECT, supra note 55, at 204-05. Additionally, the
1976 Act version was extraordinarily complex. Id. Finally, according to the ALI report,
the central defect inherent in either version was that it:
is too harsh when it disallows any part of a loss carryover that is only a minor
incident in an acquisition transaction; at the same time it is too lenient, assum-
ing we are to have any limitations at all, when it allows any friAction of a loss
carryover in the absence of any other elements of value.
Id at 201; see also SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FNAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 68.
137 See ALl SUBCHAPTER C PROJECT, supra note 55, at 200-01.
138 Id. at 198-301.
139 Id. at 225.
140 Id. at 240. According to the ALI study, the purpose of its net operating loss pro-
posal is
to make the tax law more nearly neutral with respect to combination and acqui-
sition transactions involving loss corporations by eliminating gross biases for or
against such transactions. It is inconsistent with this purpose either to disallow
loss carryovers entirely or to allow them without limitation, and the proposal
therefore seeks to steer a middle course.
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ing premise was that, following an acquisition transaction, an ac-
quiring corporation should be able to use the acquired
corporation's net operating loss carryovers only to the extent that
the acquired corporation could have generated income to use
them in the absence of such a change in control.' As one com-
mentator aptly explained, "Under this approach, a buyer would
not pay additional amounts in order to get the benefit of the
carryovers and their impact on corporation acquisitions would be
neutralized."142
At the same time that the ALI project was being conducted,
the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee was undertaking anoth-
er comprehensive Subchapter C study.'43 Issued in September,
1983, the preliminary study contained a proposal for limiting the
use of net operating losses following a change in the ownership of
a loss corporation which was substantially similar to the ALI pro-
posal. Under the Senate Finance Committee Staff proposal, the
use of the net operating losses of a loss corporation following a
change in its ownership would be limited in annual amount. The
amount would be determined by the losses that the corporation
could have used in the absence of a change in ownership had the
corporation started to earn income at an assumed rate of return
on the assets that it owned at the time that the change in owner-
ship occurred.'44 The Senate Finance Committee Staff argued
that its proposal would preserve the averaging function of net
operating loss carryovers and would achieve economic neutrality by
allowing a buyer to enjoy only those tax benefits that the seller
could have enjoyed in the absence of an acquisition. The propos-
al, the Committee maintained, would also prevent the appearance
of trafficking in net operating losses by allowing the use of carry-
141 BrrrIER & EUSTICE, supra note 39, at 16-60.
142 Faber, supra note 28, at 2-19.
143 STAFF OF SENATE FIN. COMM., 98TH CONG., lsT SEss., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICA-
TION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE FIN. COMM. STAFF PRELIMINARY REPORT].
144 Id. at 68. According to the proposal, such a rule would prevent new owners from
injecting capital into the loss corporation so that the owners could use the net operating
losses more quickly than if no change in ownership and capital infusion had occurred.
Id.
It should be noted that both the ALI proposal and the Senate Finance Committee
Staff Preliminary Report contain separate rules for taxable acquisitions and tax-free merg-
ers. The proposals outlined herein illustrate the taxable "purchase" rules of both reports;
the "merger" rules were dropped in the final version of § 382, purportedly because they
were too complex. See ALl SUBCHAPTER C PROJECT, supra note 55, at 237-39; SENATE FIN.
COMM. STAFF PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 143, at 68-74.
(Vol. 68:133
NET OPERATING LOSSES
overs "only to the extent that they are incidental to the acquired
business. "145
The final report of the Senate Finance Committee Staff was
released in 1985 and followed the basic outline of both the ALL
proposal and the Staffs Preliminary Report. The proposal, pur-
portedly based solely on the policy of tax neutrality, proposed a
single purchase rule whereby any greater-than-fifty-percent change
in the stock ownership of a loss corporation would result in a
limitation on the use of the corporation's net operating losses
thereafter. 146 The limitation was applied on an annual basis and
was equal to the value of the loss corporation immediately before
the change in ownership, multiplied by an "absorption" rate,
which was deemed to be the federal long-term tax-exempt
rate. 47 Finally, the report proposed that net operating loss carry-
overs that were limited by the newly proposed section 382 provi-
sions would not also be subject to disallowance under section
269.148
The structure of the final version of section 382, contained in
the Tax Reform Act of 1986,141 was substantially similar to the fi-
nal proposal of the Senate Finance Committee Staff.150 It dif-
fered from the Committee proposal, however, in many important
respects.
145 SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 143, at 99-101.
146 SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 70.
147 Id. at 70-71. The absorption rate essentially measured the rate at which a corpora-
tion could use its net operating losses to offset taxable income. Id. at 71. The Senate
Finance Committee Staff Final Report quoted numerous statistics aimed at determining a
proper absorption rate for a loss corporation. It concluded that the federal long-term tax-
exempt rate found in § 1274(d) of the Code represented a realistic, albeit slightly gen-
erous, rate of return for such a corporation. Id. at 71-72; see I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1988).
148 SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 56, 250.
149 Pub. L. No.. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
150 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 294. The Joint Committee's explanation states that
"[t]he Act draws heavily on the recommendations regarding limitations on NOL
carryforwards that were made by the Finance Committee Staff as part of its comprehen-
sive final report regarding reform of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code." Id.
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A. Statutory Framework of the New
Section 382 Limitations"'
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986,152 Congress adopted a "limi-
tation on earnings" approach for restricting the use of a
corporation's net operating losses following a substantial change in
the ownership of its stock.5 3 Under new section 382 of the
Code,"5 4 restrictions on the use of a corporation's net operating
losses are triggered by an "ownership change."'5 5 An ownership
change occurs if the aggregate stockholdings of all five percent
shareholders'5 6 of the loss corporation increase by more than fif-
ty percentage points over the lowest percentage held by such
shareholders during a three-year testing period. 5 7 Each percent-
age point increase is based not on the number of outstanding
shares of the loss corporation, but rather on the total value of the
151 The discussion of new § 382 does not attempt to cover all of the myriad techni-
cal details of that provision. Several articles, however, provide detailed overviews of the
new § 382 provisions. See, e.g., Faber, supra note 28, at 2-20 to 2-51; Golub, supra note
102, at 2-17 to 2-30. Additionally, numerous articles, cited in the footnotes that follow,
address the various aspects of new § 382. One commentator best described the enormous
complexity of the new § 382 provisions when he wrote that "[t]he rules determining
when an ownership change occurs alone are staggering in their intricacy, constituting a
labyrinthine morass of hypertechnical regulations that are difficult to comprehend and
virtually impossible to apply to real-life situations." Jerred G. Blanchard, Jr., The Single
Entity Theoiy of the Consolidated Section 382 Regulations: A Study in Complexity, 69 TAXES 915,
917 n.10 (1991).
152 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
153 See BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 295. "This 'limitation on earnings' approach is
intended to permit the survival of NOL carryforwards after an acquisition, while limiting
the ability to utilize the carryforwards against unrelated income." Id.
154 The term "Code" hereinafter refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
155 I.R.C. § 382(b), (d) (1988).
156 The term "five percent shareholders" is defined infra notes 163-66 and accompa-
nying text.
157 I.R.C. § 382(g)(1) (1988). Determining whether an ownership change has oc-
curred can be a complex matter. For example, an ownership change can occur as a
result of either (1) an owner shift involving a five percent shareholder; or (2) an equity
structure shift. Id. A transaction involving an owner shift generally will be a stock acquisi-
tion either from a five percent shareholder or by an entity that becomes a five percent
shareholder as a result of the purchase. An owner shift can be either a taxable or a tax-
free transaction. See BrrTKER & EusTIcE, supra note 39, at 16-71. An equity structure shift
encompasses some type of reorganization under § 368 of the Code. A single transaction,
such as a recapitalization, can constitute both an owner shift and an equity structure
shift. Id. Because § 382 affords the same treatment to both types of ownership changes,
some commentators believe that these dual definitions are unnecessary in practice. Id.
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loss corporation's stock.' For example, if creditors of the loss
corporation, who previously had owned none of its stock, acquired
voting preferred stock of the corporation representing forty per-
cent of the total value of the loss corporation's outstanding stock,
and voting common stock representing eleven percent of the total
value of its stock, an ownership change would have been trig-
gered. This is so even though the creditors own less than fifty
percent of each class of stock because they would own more than
fifty percent of the total value of the loss corporation's out-
standing stock compared with the amount (zero) that they had
previously owned. 9
For purposes of determining whether an ownership change
has occurred, transfers involving non-voting, "pure" preferred stock
are disregarded.6'' Regulations promuilgated under section 382
prescribe complex rules for treating warrants, options, contracts to
acquire stock, convertible debt instruments, and other similar
interests as stock.'' In addition, special rules are prescribed for
attributing stock owned by a corporation ratably to its sharehold-
ers and stock owned by a partnership ratably to its partners.6 2
158 I.R.C. § 382(k)(6)(C) (1988).
159 This example assumes that the creditors' acquisitions of the voting preferred stock
and the voting common stock occur within a three-year period.
160 I.R.C. § 382(k) (6) (A) (1988). So-called "pure" preferred stock is stock that:
(1) is not entitled to vote, (2) is limited and preferred as to dividends and does
not participate in corporate growth to any significant extent, (3) has redemption
and liquidation rights that do not exceed the stock's issue price upon issuance
(except for a reasonable redemption premium), and (4) is not convertible to
any other class of stock.
BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 300-01; see also I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) (1988).
The regulations promulgated under § 382 indicate that, although pure preferred
stock is not considered "stock" for determining whether an ownership change has taken
place, such stock is nevertheless included for purposes of determining the value of the
loss corporation pursuant to § 382(e) of the Code. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-
2T(f) (18) (i). (as amended in 1992); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text. More-
over, the regulations contain rules whereby interests that are not treated as stock, such as
pure preferred stock, may nevertheless be treated as constituting stock for purposes of
the § 382 limitations. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(f) (18) (iii) (as amended in 1992);
see also Stuart J. Goldring & Andrew D. Feiner, Section 382 Ownership Change: The Funda-
mentals, 66 TAXES 427, 437-45 (1988); Mark J. Silverman & Kevin M. Keyes, An Analysis of
the New Ownership Regs. Under Section 382: Part I, 68 J. TAX'N 68, 71-76 (1988).
161 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(h)(4) (as amended in 1992). For two excellent arti-
cles dealing with the treatment of options under § 382, see Timothy C. Sherck, Treatment
of Options in Applying Stock Ownership Tests in the Corporate World, 66 TAXES 935 (1988);
Stuart J. Goldring & Andrew D. Feiner, Section 382 Ownership Change: Option Attribution, 66
TAXES 803 (1988).
162 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(h)(2) (as amended in 1992).
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A key determination that must be made in ascertaining wheth-
er an ownership change has occurred is identifying the five per-
cent shareholders of a loss corporation. As the term might sug-
gest, the definition of a five percent shareholder encompasses any
individual who owns five percent or more of the value of the loss
corporation's stock at any time during the three-year testing peri-
od.163 Additionally, all shareholders of the loss corporation own-
ing less than five percent of its stock are aggregated together and
deemed to constitute a single five percent shareholder. 64 The
regulations set forth a special rule whereby transfers of the stock
of a loss corporation between non-five percent shareholders, in-
cluding transfers between shareholders who are aggregated togeth-
er and treated as one five percent shareholder of the loss corpora-
tion, are disregarded in determining whether an ownership change
is triggered. 6 5 Thus, even if a significant portion of the stock of
a widely held corporation changes hands over the three-year test-
ing period, it generally will not trigger an ownership change. Fi-
nally, in order to evaluate whether an ownership change has oc-
curred, all transactions involving five percent shareholders during
163 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 1992). Because the term
"five percent shareholder" encompasses any individual who owns the requisite five percent
in value of the loss corporation's stock at any time during the three-year testing period,
shareholders owning at least five percent of such stock who dispose of their stock during
the testing period are considered five percent shareholders, id., as are those who pur-
chase or increase their stockholdings to five percent or more of the loss corporation's
stock during the testing period. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(g) (1) (iv) (as amended in
1992).
In determining stock ownership percentages, the attribution rules of § 318 of the
Code apply in modified form. I.R.C. § 382(l)(3)(A) (1988). Moreover, an individual who
holds an indirect ownership interest of five percent or more of the stock of a loss corpo-
ration by virtue of owning stock of a corporate shareholder of the loss corporation which
is attributed to such individual will also be deemed a five percent shareholder. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(g)(1)(i)(B) (as amended in 1992).
164 I.R.C. § 382(g) (4) (A) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(j) (as amended in
1992); BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 301. The regulations under § 382 provide extraor-
dinarily complex rules for identifying five percent shareholders of a loss corporation,
including special rules for aggregating less-than-five percent shareholders into one such
shareholder, as well as rules 'segregating groups into separate five percent shareholders.
These rules have been the focus of many excellent articles. See, e.g., William M. Davidow,
Jr., Limitations Imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on a Corporation's Use of Net Operating
Loss Canyovers After an Ownership Change, 17 BALTIMORE L. REV. 331, 340-49 (1988); An-
drew D. Feiner & Stuart J. Goldring, Section 382 Ownership Change: Identiflcation of 5 Percent
Shareholders, 66 TAxES 619 (1988); Mark J. Silverman & Kevin M. Keyes, An Analysis of the
New Ownership Regs. Under Section 382: Part III, 68 J. TAX'N 300 (1988).
165 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(e)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1992).
[Vol. 68:133
NET OPERATING LOSSES
the three-year testing period are considered, even if the transac-
tions are unrelated. 66
If an ownership change occurs,, section 382 limits the amount
of income that may be offset each year by net operating losses
incurred prior to the ownership change (the "general limita-
tion").' 67 Under the general limitation, the amount of income
that can be sheltered each year is equal to the fair market value
of the loss corporation immediately prior to the ownership
change, multiplied by the federal long-term tax-exempt rate in
effect at the time the ownership change occurs. 6' For purposes
of the general limitation, the value of the loss corporation is
deemed to be equal to the fair market value of its stock, including
the value of any "pure" preferred stock that is not treated as stock
for purposes of determining whether an ownership change has oc-
curred.'69 The value of the loss corporation is reduced, however,
by capital contributions made within the two-year period ending
on the date of the ownership change, in order that the loss
corporation's shareholders cannot artificially inflate the value of
the loss corporation in an effort to increase the general limitation
following the ownership change. 70 The general limitation re-
flects the theory that the purchaser of a loss corporation's net
operating loss carryovers should not be entitled to utilize them at
166 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 314.
167 This limitation will be referred to herein as the "general limitation" so as to
distinguish it from the special limitations applicable to a corporation's net operating
losses in bankruptcy. See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text. In addition to limit-
ing the use of net operating losses incurred prior to the ownership change, § 382 also
limits the use of built-in losses at the time the ownership change occurs in certain cir-
cumstances. See I.R.C. § 382(h) (1988 & Supp. I 1989); see also Davidow, supra note 164,
at 354-56.
168 I.R.C. § 382(a), (b)(1) (1988). Section 382 also provides that, with certain limited
exceptions, if the new loss corporation fails to carry on the business enterprise of the
old loss corporation for two years following the ownership change, the general limitation
thereafter will be zero. I.R.C. § 382(c)(1) (1988). In other words, if the continuity-of-
business-enterprise requirement (initially established under § 368 of the Code) is not met
after an ownership change, none of the loss corporation's net operating loss carryovers
can be used. For a discussion of the continuity-of-business-enterprise test, see Rizzi, supra
note 99, at 127-28.
169 I.R.C. § 382(e)(1) (1988). The long-term tax-exempt rate is published monthly by
the Treasury Department. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 92-23, 1992-14 I.R.B. 6-7. Whether the long-
term tax-exempt rate accomplishes the congressional objective of achieving neutrality in
the transfer of net operating loss carryovers has been the subject of several law review
articles. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 25, at 1069-85.
170 I.R.C. § 382(l)(1) (1988). This rule is often referred to as the "anti-stuffing" rule.
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a faster rate than the loss corporation could have generated in-
come to use them in the absence of an ownership change.
1 7 1
B. Special Statutory Provisions Affecting Corporations
in Title 11 Proceedings
Because the value of the stock of a loss corporation in bank-
ruptcy will normally be negligible immediately prior to any owner-
ship change resulting from its reorganization plan, the general
limitation will normally eliminate any significant benefit from the
net operating losses of such a corporation. 1 2 For this reason,
there are two special provisions that may enable a loss corporation
in a Title 11 case to use a portion of its net operating losses fol-
lowing an ownership change. As described more fully below, the
first of these special provisions would render the general limitation
inapplicable in certain circumstances, but would impose other
limitations on a'loss corporation's use of its net operating loss
carryovers following an ownership change in bankruptcy. 7 This
approach will be referred to hereinafter as the "bankruptcy alter-
native." The second of the two special provisions would apply the
general limitation, but would permit the value of the loss corpo-
ration to be determined immediately following the ownership
change, rather than just prior to the ownership change. 7 4 This
provision will be referred to hereinafter as the "special insolvency
limitation."
1. The Bankruptcy Alternative
Recognizing that the creditors of a loss corporation are, in
reality, its true owners and that they have borne the economic
burden of those losses reflected in the corporation's net operating
loss carryovers, Congress provided limited relief from the applica-
tion of the general limitation in the form of the bankruptcy alter-
native. 175 The bankruptcy alternative, rather than the general
171 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 296.
172 Id. at 299. For example, if a loss corporation had assets of $200 million and
liabilities of $350 million immediately before undergoing an ownership change in a Title
11 proceeding, the value of the loss corporation, for purposes of calculating the general
limitation, would be zero. Thus, none of its net operating losses could be used to offset
its income following the ownership change under the general limitation.
173 See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
174 See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
175 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 299. The Joint Committee Report provides that, in
the case of an insolvent corporation, "the loss corporation's creditors are the true owners
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limitation, applies 76 to any ownership change experienced by a
loss corporation that meets two requirements. First, the loss corpo-
ration must be under the jurisdiction of a court in a Title 11 or
similar case 7 7  immediately before the ownership change.'
78
Thus, a corporation undergoing an ownership change in a Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceeding will satisfy the first requirement for
application of the bankruptcy alternative.
Second, those persons who were the shareholders and/or
creditors of the loss corporation immediately before the ownership
change must own, immediately after the ownership change and as
a result of the ownership of their prior interests, stock of the loss
corporation representing at least fifty percent of the total voting
power and fifty percent of the total value of the loss corporation's
outstanding stock. 79 The bankruptcy alternative's second require-
ment can also be met if the historic creditors and/or shareholders
of the loss corporation own the same percentage of stock of a
parent corporation, rather than of the subsidiary loss corporation,
and if the parent is also involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. 8
of the corporation, although it may be impossible to identify the point in time when
ownership shifted from the corporation's shareholders." Id. The Joint Committee Report
cites Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942), which has long
stood for the proposition that creditors of an insolvent corporation are its true owners.
Alabama Asphaltic provides that:
[w]hen the equity owners are excluded and the old creditors become the stock-
holders of the new corporation, it conforms to realities to date their equity
ownership from the time when they invoked the processes of the law to enforce
their rights of full priority. At that time they stepped into the shoes of the old
stockholders.
Id. at 184 (citations omitted).
176 If its requirements are met, application of the bankruptcy alternative is automatic,
unless the debtor corporation makes an affirmative election not to have the provisions
apply. For a discussion of. this election, see infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
177 A "Title 11 or similar case" includes proceedings commenced under ainy chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), as well as a
receivership, a foreclosure, or a similar proceeding commenced in either federal or state
court. I.R.C. § 368(a)(3)(A) (1988).
178 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(A),(i) (1988). The legislative history additionally provides that
the bankruptcy alternative will only apply if the transaction giving rise to the ownership
change either (1) is ordered by the court; or (2) takes place pursuant to a plan that is
approved by such court. BLUE BooK, supra note 135, at 321.
179 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(A)(ii) (1988). In determining whether shareholders and cred-
itors together own the requisite 50% of the loss corporation's stock, so-called "pure" pre-
ferred stock is not counted in the calculation. See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2), (4) (1988). For a
definition of "pure" preferred stock, see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
180 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(A)(ii) (1988).
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Responding to concerns that an outside investor might pur-
chase creditors' claims either immediately prior to the bankruptcy
proceeding or during the proceeding, and then exchange such
claims for stock without triggering the general limitation,181 Con-
gress fashioned a special rule whereby only stock received by cer-
tain creditors would be taken into account in satisfying the fifty
percent ownership test. The rule provided that in order for stock
received by a creditor in exchange for indebtedness to be taken
into account, the creditor must have held the indebtedness for at
least eighteen months before the filing of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, or the indebtedness must have arisen in the ordinary course
of the loss corporation's trade or business.1 82 These historic cred-
itors are often referred to as "old and cold" creditors.
If the bankruptcy alternative applies, the general limitation is
inapplicable. Instead, the net operating loss carryovers of the loss
corporation are reduced by the sum of (1) the interest paid or
accrued by the loss corporation during the taxable year in which
the ownership change occurs (ending on the date of the owner-
ship change) and in the three preceding taxable years on that
portion of the indebtedness converted into stock under the re-
organization plan (the "interest reduction");8 ' and (2) one-half
181 The Joint Committee Report provided the following hypothetical as an example
of potential abusive transactions that could occur if the bankruptcy alternative were gen-
erally available:
For example, if there were a general stock-for-debt exception, an acquiring cor-
poration could purchase a loss corporation's debt immediately before or during
a bankruptcy proceeding, exchange the debt for stock without triggering the
special limitations, and then use the loss corporation's NOL carryforwards imme-
diately and without limitation.
BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 299.
182 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(E) (1988). Indebtedness arising in the ordinary course of the
loss corporation's trade or business must be held by the creditor who "at all times held
the beneficial interest in such indebtedness." Id. Thus, ordinary course indebtedness can-
not be sold by the original creditor if the loss corporation is to count the stock received
in exchange for it toward the 50% requirement According to the legislative history, in-
debtedness will be treated as ordinary course only if the loss corporation incurs the in-
debtedness "in connection with the normal, usual, or customary conduct of its business."
BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 321. In many contexts it is very difficult to determine
whether indebtedness meets this ordinary course standard. See infrta notes 221-22 and
accompanying text.
183 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(B) (1988). The theory behind this net operating loss reduction
is that the debt that was converted into stock was in essence an equity interest during
such three-year period, and payments made to equity holders are nondeductible. See SEN-
ATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 249-50; see also BITrKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 39, at 16-88.
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of the amount of debt discharged in the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion that would not -otherwise reduce the net operating loss carry-
overs of the loss corporation because of tle stock-for-debt excep-
tion.
84
To illustrate the application of these rules, assume that a
debtor corporation has $100 of net operating loss carryovers and
debt of $90, of which $10 is accrued interest. If the corporation
issues only stock with a $50 value in exchange for.its debt, its net
operating losses would be reduced under the bankruptcy alterna-
tive to $75. This number is determined by reducing the net oper-
ating losses of $100 first by the $10 of accrued interest, to $90.
The losses are then further reduced by $15, representing one-half
of debt discharged for stock, excluding the interest reduction
already taken into account ($90 of debt less $50 stock value re-
ceived less $10 interest reduction = $30 x .5 = $15), leaving net
operating loss carryovers of $75.
As originally enacted, section 382(0(5) required a double
reduction of a loss corporation's net operating loss carryovers for
accrued interest that was included as part of the debt canceled in
exchange for stock. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988,"5 however, amended section 382 so that such accrued
interest was not counted 'twice."8 Under the bankruptcy alterna-
tive, a loss corporation need not meet the two-year business conti-
nuity requirement of section 382(c). 87
A major disadvantage of the bankruptcy alternative is that, if a
second ownership change occurs within two years after the first
184 I.RC. § 382(0(5)(C) (1988); see also I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
As part of the Revenue Act of 1987, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10136(b)
(1987), the House attempted to reduce a loss corporation's net operating loss carryovers
by 100%, rather than 50%, of discharged debt for which the stock-for-debt exception was
applicable. The House of Representative's amendment was dropped in the final version
of the legislation. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330 (1987). This debt discharge provision appears to have no policy justification,
except as a source of raising revenue.
185 Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988) [hereinafter TAMRA].
186 TAMRA § 1006(d)(18), 102 Stat. at 3398; see I.R.C. § 382()(5)(C)(ii) (1988). In
the example above, if the corporation had issued stock with a $50 value in exchange for
its debt prior to the amendments made by TAMRA, its net operating losses would have
been reduced under the bankruptcy alternative to $70 rather than $75. The calculation
would be made as follows: $100 of net operating losses less (1) $10 interest reduction,
less (2) one-half times $40 of debt discharged ($90 of debt minus $50 of stock equals
$40), or $20.
187 See 57 Fed. Reg. 343 (1992) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(m)). But see
infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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ownership change, the net operating loss carryovers of the loss
corporation are completely eliminated for periods subsequent to
the second ownership change.1 88 Moreover, the general limita-
tion, rather than the bankruptcy alternative, becomes applicable
retroactively to the period between the ownership changes. 8 9
A loss corporation involved in a Title 11 proceeding may elect
not to have the bankruptcy alternative apply. 90 If such an elec-
tion is made, either the general limitation will apply or, if the
requirements below are satisfied, the "special insolvency limitation"
will apply.
2. The Special Insolvency Limitation
If the loss corporation elects to forego application of the
bankruptcy alternative, or if the bankruptcy alternative does not
apply to an exchange of stock for debt in a Title 11 proceed-
ing, 19' the general limitation will apply, but with the modifica-
tions provided by the special insolvency limitation. 9 2 Under the
special insolvency limitation, 93 the value of the loss corporation,
for purposes of calculating the general limitation, is determined
immediately after the ownership change, rather than immediately
188 I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(D) (1988). The Senate Finance Committee Staff best explained
the reason for this provision in its Final Report: "Because the value of the corporation at
the time of the Title 11 change was presumably zero, and any capital contributions dur-
ing the ensuing two years are disregarded, this rule explicitly provides that the section
382 limitation at the time of the second change would be zero." SENATE FIN. COMM.
STAFF FINAL REPORT,'supra note 96, at 56.
189 Id.; see also Robert A. Jacobs, The Chapter 11 Corporate Tax Survival Kit or How to
Succeed As Guardian Ad Litem of a Corporate Debtor's NOLs, 42 TAX LAW. 3, 20 n.78 (1988).
190 I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(H) (1988).
191 The bankruptcy alternative might not apply, for example, if creditors who do not
qualify as "old and cold" creditors receive more than 50% of the loss corporation's stock
in the bankruptcy reorganization.
192 The special insolvency limitation provides as follows:
(6) SPECIAL RULE FOR INSOLVENCY TRANSACTIONS. - If paragraph
(5) does not apply to any reorganization described in subparagraph (G) of sec-
tion 368(a)(1) or any exchange of debt for stock in a title 11 or similar case
(as defined in section 368(a)(3)(A)), the value under subsection (e) shall reflect
the increase (if any) in value of the old loss corporation resulting from any
surrender or cancellation of creditors' claims in the transaction.
I.R.C. § 382(l)(6) (1988).
193 Although this Article refers to § 382()(6) as the "special insolvency limitation,"
and that section is entitled "Special Rule For Insolvency Transactions," these references
are somewhat misleading. It is not a prerequisite that a corporation be insolvent in order
to invoke § 382(l)(6) of the Code. Rather, the corporation must be involved in a Title
11 proceeding, and either (1) be engaged in a G reorganization; or (2) exchange debt
for stock in that Title 11 proceeding. Id.
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before the ownership change. Thus, this calculation reflects the
increase in the value of the loss corporation's stock attributable to
any surrender or cancellation of creditors' claims in exchange for
stock.'94 For example, assume that a loss corporation in a Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceeding has assets of $200 and liabilities of
$350 immediately before undergoing an ownership change as part
of its reorganization plan. For purposes of applying the general
limitation, the value of the loss corporation would be zero imme-
diately prior to the ownership change. If, however, the loss
corporation's creditors agree to cancel all of their claims in ex-
change for one hundred percent of the loss corporation's stock as
part of the reorganization plan, the value of the loss corporation
immediately after the ownership change (and as a result of the
cancellation of creditors' claims in exchange for stock) will be
$200, and this value, rather than zero, will be used for calculating
the general limitation.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE
AND THE SPECIAL INSOLVENCY LIMITATION
AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In theory, the intent of Congress in enacting the bankruptcy
alternative and the special insolvency limitation was to facilitate
the successful reorganization of corporations in Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings. In practice, however, the provisions are unsuccessful in
implementing these goals. Both the bankruptcy alternative and the
special insolvency limitation are fraught with uncertainty. More-
over, the considerations involved in choosing between the two
provisions are extraordinarily complex. Oftentimes, both provisions
result in a significant reduction in a debtor corporation's net
194 Id.; see also BLUE BooK, supra note 135, at 322. Several commentators have ob-
served that the special insolvency limitation "is an exception to the requirement that the
loss corporation's value be reduced for capital contributions received during the two-year
period ending on the ownership change date." Brian B. Gibney & Carleen R. Hayes,
Limitations on the Use of Aet Operating Loss Carryovers, 95 COM. LJ. 56, 71 (1990); see also
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
As originally enacted, the special insolvency limitation would have permitted the loss
corporation's value to be increased not only by the cancellation of creditors' claims in
the bankruptcy reorganization, but also by an infusion of new capital by an outside inves-
tor as part of the bankruptcy reorganization. The provisions of TAMRA clarified that only
those increases to the loss corporation's value resulting from the cancellation of creditors'
claims would be considered for purposes of the special insolvency limitation. See TAMRA,
§ 1006(d)(9), 102 Stat. at 3397, formerly the Technical Corrections Bill of 1988, S. 2238,
H.R. 4333, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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operating losses following bankruptcy reorganization, without any
underlying policy justification. Each of these topics is considered
separately below. Accordingly, an amendment to section 382 is
necessary to achieve the goal of successfully rehabilitating finan-
cially troubled corporations in Chapter 11.
A. The Complex Election Between the
Two Bankruptcy Provisions
Any bankruptcy reorganization plan in which the loss
corporation's creditors receive more than fifty percent of its stock
(a "creditors' plan") will effect an ownership change. If an owner-
ship change occurs, the corporation's net operating loss carryovers
will be restricted under either the bankruptcy alternative or the
special insolvency limitation, as discussed below.
For purposes of analysis, assume that under a creditors' plan
one hundred percent of the loss corporation's stock is received by
the creditors in exchange for all of their claims, thereby triggering
an ownership change. The exchange qualifies for the bankruptcy
alternative because the creditors of the corporation before the
reorganization own at least fifty percent of its stock following the
reorganization.'95 Alternatively, because the plan involves an ex-
change of stock for debt in the loss corporation's Title 11 pro-
ceeding, it qualifies for the special insolvency limitation if the
corporation elects out of the bankruptcy alternative.
The following computations will be used as a framework for
discussing the complex election between the bankruptcy alternative
and the special insolvency limitation, and will illustrate the effect
of the two alternatives on the debtor corporation's net operating
losses. The computations are based on the following assumptions:
(1) immediately before the ownership change, the corporation has
$300 million of net operating losses, indebtedness of $350 million
(including accrued interest of $6 million), and net assets of $200
million (excluding the $350 million of debt); and (2) interest paid
or accrued on debt during the relevant period includes $54 mil-
lion paid as well as the $6 million accrued and included in the
$350 million of debt.
195 The creditors must meet the definition of "old and cold" creditors pursuant to
I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(E) (1988).
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Bankruptcy Alternative
(in millions)
Net operating losses before
ownership change: $300
Net operating loss reductions:
Interest reduction:19 6  $60
Reduction for debt
discharge income:
Debt discharged for stock: $350
Less: Accrued interest
included in debt
discharge: 19 7
$344
Less: Value of stock
exchanged for debt: $200
Debt discharge income:' $144
One-half thereof."'99  $72
Total reductions: $132
Net operating losses after
ownership change:" $168
196 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(B) (1988).
197 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(C) (1988).
198 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988).
199 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(C).
200 The $300 million of net operating losses approximates the operating losses
claimed or to be claimed by the loss corporation in its returns. If the Internal Revenue
Service reduces these amounts up6n audit, the amount available under the bankruptcy
aliernative after an ownership change would, of course, be less by the amount of the
audit reductions.
19921
176 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:133
Now suppose that the creditors received, in exchange for
their debt, not only all of the stock of the loss corporation, but
also $100 million of new debt. The effect on the corporation's net
operating losses would be as follows:
Net operating losses before change: $300
Net operating loss reductions:
Interest reduction on
debt discharged for
stock: ($60 x $250/$350) $43
Reduction for debt discharge
income:
Debt discharged
for stock: $250
Less: accrued interest
included in debt
discharge:
($6 x $250/$350) $4.3
$245.7
Less: Value of stock
exchanged for debt: $100
Debt discharge income: $145.7
One-half thereof: $72.85
Total reductions: $115.85
Net operating losses after
ownership change: $184.15
NET OPERATING LOSSES
Note that on the facts assumed, the available net operating
losses increase by $16.15 million when the amount of debt dis-
charged is reduced by issuing $100 million of new debt. 0 1 Ac-
cordingly, the bankruptcy alternative provides creditors with the
flexibility to obtain debt in addition to stock without adversely
affecting the loss corporation's net operating losses, provided that
the amount of stock issued in relation to debt is not nominal or
token. It is noteworthy that any stock allotted to shareholders or
management instead of the corporation's creditors will reduce the
value of the stock exchanged for the creditors' debt, thereby in-
creasing the aggregate amount of debt cancellation and resulting
in a greater net operating loss reduction.
Now suppose that the loss corporation elects not to have the
bankruptcy alternative apply, so that the effect of the ownership
change upon utilization of its net operating loss carryovers is de-
termined under the special insolvency limitation.
Special Insolvency Limitation
(in millions)
Value of the loss corporation's stock
immediately prior to ownership change
(assets of $200, liabilities of $350): $0
Increase in value of the loss corporation's
stock due to cancellation of $350 of
debt in exchange for 100% of stock: $200
Long-term tax-exempt rate (assumed): 7.5%
Annual limitation under special insolvency
limitation (allowable each year until
net operating losses expire or are
fully utilized):
$200 x .075 $15
201 The $16.15 million consists of the $17 million of interest reduction attributable to
the $100 million of debt discharged in the first computation, but not in the second com-
putation, minus one-half of the $1.7 million of interest assumed to be included in the
debt discharged in the first computation but not in the second computation.
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If it is assumed instead that the debtor corporation issues all
of its stock plus $100 million of new debt in exchange for the
$350 million of old debt held by the creditors, the increase in
value of the stock attributable to debt cancellation would be only
$100. million instead of $200 million as in the above computation.
As a result, the annual amount of net operating losses that are
available under the special insolvency limitation would be $7.5 mil-
lion rather than $15 million. Of course, the interest on the $100
million of debt is deductible without limitation as long as the debt
is outstanding.
The foregoing scenarios demonstrate that the choice between
the bankruptcy alternative and the special insolvency limitation can
be extraordinarily difficult and complex. Assuming that a debtor
corporation qualifies for both special bankruptcy provisions, a
number of factors will bear upon the choice between the bank-
ruptcy alternative and the special insolvency limitation. First, if all
of the existing debt is canceled in exchange for all of the loss
corporation's stock, the bankruptcy alternative in the foregoing
illustration would leave $168 million of net operating losses avail-
able to offset the corporation's taxable income as rapidly as it
could generate that income. On the other hand, the special insol-
vency limitation would produce an annual amount of net operat-
ing losses of $15 million available to offset taxable income. Assum-
ing that all of the available net operating losses could be absorbed
by the loss corporation's future before-tax income prior to the
expiration of the applicable fifteen-year carryover period, $225
million (fifteen years times $15 million per year) of net operating
losses could be utilized under the special insolvency limitation. If
the loss corporation's anticipated before-tax earnings would sub-
stantially exceed $15 million per year, the bankruptcy alternative
would result in faster utilization of the net operating losses. This
might prove more valuable to the corporation even if the net
operating losses are less in total amount than under the special
insolvency limitation. Unfortunately, it is difficult for corporations
emerging from Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings to estimate
their future earnings with any accuracy. Accordingly, a corporation
relying on rosy financial projections might elect the bankruptcy
alternative so that it could utilize its net operating losses rapidly;
however, should those financial projections not materialize, the
corporation might discover that it suffered a reduction in its net
operating losses by electing the bankruptcy alternative without any
offsetting benefit.
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A second factor affecting a debtor corporation's choice be-
tween the two bankruptcy provisions is that, under the special in-
solvency limitation, cancellation of less than all of the loss
corporation's debt results in a greater net operating loss reduction
than cancellation of all of the debt. On the other hand, under
the bankruptcy alternative, a smaller net operating loss reduction
may result if some debt is left outstanding rather than if all of the
debt is canceled, depending upon the interest reduction attribut-
able to the debt discharged."' Accordingly, if, as is often the
case, creditors insist on retaining at least a portion of their debt, a
loss corporation might be forced to elect the bankruptcy alterna-
tive even if countervailing factors indicate that the special insolven-
cy limitation is otherwise warranted. Moreover, attorneys for both
the debtor corporation and its creditors must engage in complex
calculations to determine the impact of debt retention on the
corporation's net operating losses under both alternatives.
Although the first two factors tend to favor the bankruptcy
alternative, there are two other factors that favor the special insol-
vency limitation. Under the bankruptcy alternative, net operating
losses are actually reduced by the accrued interest and debt reduc-
tion amounts outlined above. Conversely, under the special insol-
vency limitation, there is no reduction in a corporation's net oper-
ating losses, but the ability of net operating losses to offset taxable
income is curtailed. For example, the scenarios described above
illustrate that net operating losses under the bankruptcy alternative
are reduced to $168 million, while they remain at $300 million
under the special insolvency limitation (but a maximum of $225
million can be used before they expire). If the Internal Revenue
Service successfully challenges the deductions comprising a debtor
corporation's net operating losses once it begins to use them to
offset taxable income following bankruptcy, the result will be a
reduction in the corporation's available net operating losses. Such
202 Following the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 11325(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-1466 (1990), if a corporation issues new debt in ex-
change for existing debt, adverse tax consequences may result. Under new § 108(e)(11)
of the Codg, a debt-for-debt exchange may result in income from cancellation of indebt-
edness to the loss corporation issuing the new debt (or a reduction in its net operating
losses assuming that the exchange takes place in a Title 11 proceeding), as well as origi-
nal issue discount income to the creditor holding the debt. I.R.C. § 108(e)(11) (West
Supp. 1992). A discussion of this complex new provision is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a detailed discussion of § 108(e)(11) and its impact on debtor corpoiations
in bankruptcy proceedings, see William Hoke, The Tax Consequences of Restructuring Trou-
bled Corporations' Debt, FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REV., Fall 1991, at 31.
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a reduction will have a far more significant impact on available
net operating losses under the bankruptcy alternative than under
the special insolvency limitation.
To illustrate, assume that challenges by the Service result in a
$50 million reduction in net operating losses. Under the special
insolvency limitation, available net operating losses would be re-
duced from $300 million to $250 million; however, because a
maximum of $225 million could be used during the fifteen-year
carryover period to offset taxable income, the Service's successful
challenge would not diminish the availability of net operating
losses under this limitation. Conversely, under the bankruptcy
alternative, net operating losses would be reduced from $168 mil-
lion to $118 million, thereby significantly affecting the availability
of these losses. Because it is often impossible to predict whether
the Internal Revenue Service will wage such a challenge once the
loss corporation begins to utilize its net operating losses, and diffi-
cult to gauge whether such a challenge, if made, will prove suc-
cessful, it is hard to determine what weight this factor should be
given when choosing between the bankruptcy alternative and the
special insolvency limitation.
The second factor that renders the bankruptcy alternative less
attractive is that a corporation's net operating losses under that
provision are virtually eliminated if a second ownership change
occurs within two years after the bankruptcy reorganization. 23 By
contrast, if the special insolvency limitation is elected, a second
ownership change would only cause a new limitation to be com-
puted using the general limitation provisions of section 382. Un-
less the value of the stock had declined in the intervening period,
the annual amount of net operating losses available following such
a second ownership change would not be affected adversely.
2 4
To preclude the possibility of a second ownership change under
the bankruptcy alternative, most tax practitioners require that at
least half of the debtor corporation's stock contain restrictions
prohibiting its transfer for a two-year period. °5 Such transfer re-
strictions significantly reduce the value of the loss corporation's
stock and may also prove unacceptable .to certain creditors, such
203 I.R.C. § 382(0(5)(D) (1988).
204 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(n)(2), 57 Fed. Reg. 34,736, 34,740 (1992).
205 See Sniderman et al., supra note 20, at 201. A private letter ruling permitted stock
transfer restrictions to be imposed by an amendment to the corporate charter approved
as part of the reorganization plan. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-49-040 (Sept. 11, 1989).
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as banks subject to restrictions limiting the time that they can
hold common stock of a corporation.2 °
Each of these factors suggests that one of the special bank-
ruptcy provisions is preferable to the other. In combination, they
make an informed election between the bankruptcy .alternative
and the special insolvency limitation almost impossible.
B. Uncertainties Inherent in the Special Bankruptcy Provisions
Not only is the interplay between the bankruptcy alternative
and the special insolvency limitation extraordinarily complex, but
each individual bankruptcy provision is subject to considerable
uncertainty and contains many complexities on its own. Commen-
tators have suggested that the uncertainties in the variotus bank-
ruptcy tax provisions result from the lack of any predominant
underlying policies or principles.
20 7
1. The Bankruptcy Alternative
Because the incidence of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions has risen dramatically over the past few years, section
382()(5) of the Code has recently taken on increasing impor-
tance. Over the course of the past year, regulations affecting the
bankruptcy alternative have been promulgated on almost a month-
ly basis.20 8 Although these regulations have clarified some open
issues, a number of other issues are as yet unresolved.
206 See, e.g., IOWA CODE, § 524.901 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1112 (1991); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 362.170 (Supp. 1991).
207 See Rizzi, supra note 20, at 134; see also Robert A. Jacobs, Report on Suggested Bank-
ruptcy Tax Revenue Rulings, 50 TAX NOTES 631, 631 (1991) (The author suggests that
bankruptcy tax law "is complex, inconsistent, and unpredictable. Its underlying policies
are uncertain; its applications erratic. There is no first principle to provide direction.").
208 For example, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated temporary and final regu-
lations on April 9, 1992 dealing with the impact of the option attribution rules on
§ 382(0(5). See 57 Fed. Reg. 12,208, 12,210 (1992) (to be codified at Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.382-2T, -3(e), (o)). On March 30, 1992, the Service issued final regulations defining
the concept of an "entity" for purposes of the § 382 general limitation, with a special
"entity" definition for creditors in a bankruptcy reorganization. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,739,
10,740 (1992) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2(a) (3) (i)). On January 6, 1992, the
Service promulgated final regulations relating to the interplay between § 269 and §
382(0(5). See 57 Fed. Reg. 343, 345 (1992) (to be codified at Treas. Reg..§ 1.269-3(d)).
Finally, on September 23, 1991, the Service issued proposed regulations under §
382(0(5) addressing the issue of which creditors will be deemed to be "old and cold"
creditors for purposes of the bankruptcy alternative. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(d),
56 Fed. Reg. 47,921, 47,924 (1991).
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For example, commentators have often suggested that one of
the benefits of the bankruptcy alternative over the general limita-
tion of section 382, and presumably the special insolvency limi-
tation as well, is that under the bankruptcy alternative, a loss cor-
poration is not required to satisfy the two-year continuity-of-busi-
ness-enterprise requirement that is imposed for other ownership
changes.2" Recently promulgated regulations under section 269
of the Code, however, draw this so-called advantage into question.
The regulations set forth a presumption of tax avoidance:
Absent strong evidence to the contrary, a requisite acquisition
of control or property in connection with an ownership change
to which section 382(0 (5) applies is considered to be made for
the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of Federal in-
come tax unless the corporation carries on more than an insig-
nificant amount of an active trade or business during and sub-
sequent to the title 11 or similar case."'
The regulations indicate that in determining whether the loss
corporation is deemed to carry on more than an insignificant
amount of an active trade or business, the continuity-of-business-
enterprise requirement of section 382(c) should be disregard-
ed.2" The regulations thus leave a loss corporation in consid-
erable doubt as to how much of its business it must continue to
carry on following an ownership change in order to qualify for the
bankruptcy alternative. 2  Moreover, a corporation's failure to
209 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(c), 55 Fed. Reg. 36,657, 36,659 (1990); Richard E.
Halperin, Planning for Loss Caryovers Under Section 382 When A Corporation is Insolvent, 71
J. TAX'N 150, 153 (1989). Section 382(c) of the Code contains the business continuity
rule, which provides: "[I]f the new loss corporation does not continue the business enter-
prise of the old loss corporation at all times during the 2-year period beginning on the
change date, the section 382 limitation for any post-change year shall be zero." I.R.C. §
382(c)(1) (1988).
210 57 Fed. Reg. 343, 345 (1992) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(d)(1)).
211 Id.
212 Although the regulation attempts to provide some guidance as to what would
qualify as more than an insignificant amount of an active trade or business, it basically
indicates that a facts and circumstances determination will be used. Id. The regulation
states that:
[w]here the corporation continues to utilize a significant amount of its business
assets or work force, the requirement of carrying on more than an insignificant
amount of an active trade or business may be met even though all trade or
business activities temporarily cease for a period of time in order to address
business exigencies.
Id. at 346.
Some commentators have suggested that loss corporations can resort to other Code
provisions, such as § 368, in attempting to determine what is meant by the phrase "more
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meet the nebulous test set forth in the regulations would result in
a complete elimination of the debtor corporation's net operating
losses under section 269.213
Finally, the regulations' active trade or business test is difficult
to justify on policy grounds for two reasons. First, it could result
in an unprofitable business remaining intact merely for tax pur-
poses when sound business judgment would dictate otherwise.
Such a result contravenes the neutrality concept upon which sec-
tion 382 is arguably based.214 As several commentators have aptly
stated, the presumption of tax avoidance in the section 269 regula-
tions serves to "undermine Congress's intent in providing the
bankruptcy exception, which was to aid in the rehabilitation of
bankrupt corporations."215 Second, historic creditors of a loss
corporation are to be treated as shareholders for purposes of the
bankruptcy alternative. Accordingly, the presumption of tax avoid-
ance in the section 269 regulations runs contrary to the premise
upon which the bankruptcy alternative is based by treating credi-
tors differently from shareholders. As one commentator explained,
than an insignificant amount of an active trade or business." See, e.g., Janet A. Meade &
Janice E. McClellan, Loss Caryovers in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations Under Pp. Reg.
§ 1.269-3(d), 69 TAXES 229, 233 (19,91). Those provisions, however, are illustrative in the
"continuity-of-business-enterprise" area and thus would not be of much assistance here be-
cause the § 269 regulations' business continuity test is purportedly a different, and pre-
sumably less burdensome, one.
213 I.R.C. § 269 (1988); see also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
214 See SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 70-71. It is inter-
esting to note that under the Finance Committee Staffs Final Report, § 269 would not
apply to transactions governed by § 382. Id. at 56. Congress obviously ignored the
Committee's proposal, stating in the House Conference Report to the 1986 Tax Act that
the newly revised provisions of § 382 would not override the continuing application of
§ 269. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 194 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4282.
The proposed regulations under § 269 also discuss the interplay between that provi-
sion and § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d) (1988). Section
1129(d) provides that a governmental unit can request that a reorganization plan not be
confirmed if its principal purpose is the avoidance of taxes. The section also states that
the governmental unit bears the burden of proof on the tax avoidance issue. Under 57
Fed. Reg. 343, 346 (1992) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(e)), the fact that a
governmental unit did not challenge confirmation of the reorganization plan under
§ 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is not considered when determining whether the
principal purpose of an acquisition of a loss corporation is the avoidance of federal in-
come tax. Apparently the reason for this § 269 regulation is that the burden of proof
under the Bankruptcy Code provision is on the government, while the burden of proof
under § 269 is on the taxpayer. "The presumptive position of the proposed regulation,
therefore, is especially strong since a court ruling as to the motive of the transaction .is
not controlling." Meade & McClellan, supra note 212, at 232.
215 Carmen Eggleston, Financial Statements, AM, BANKR. INST. NEWsL, Feb. 1992, at 12.
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Continuing shareholders are not subject to the tax avoid-
ance rules of Section 269. Also, such owners are not required
to continue a losing business to use the tax attributes of the
business against the income of a new investment. The explana-
tion in the Proposed Regulations for subjecting ownership
changes described in Section 382(0(5) to special scrutiny and
presuming a tax avoidance purpose unless the corporation
carries on more than an insignificant amount of business does
not explain the significant departure from the prior parallel
treatment of such creditors.
2 16
A second area of considerable uncertainty under the bank-
ruptcy alternative is how to determine which creditors qualify as
historic creditors of the loss corporation. Although the issue has
been clarified somewhat by recently promulgated regulations, it
remains a difficult one.
217
Under the newly proposed regulations, a creditor qualifies as
an historic creditor under the bankruptcy alternative if the credi-
tor holds "qualified indebtedness." Indebtedness must fall into one
of three categories in order to constitute qualified indebtedness:
(1) it has been owned by the same beneficial owner for at least
eighteen months before the filing of the Title 11 case; (2) it arose
in the ordinary course of the loss corporation's trade or business
and has been held at all times by the same beneficial owner; or
(3) it falls within the regulations' new category of "widely held
indebtedness." 2
18
The first category of qualified indebtedness, eighteen-month
debt, is relatively straightforward. The regulations clarify that an
otherwise qualified creditor who undergoes an ownership change
generally will not lose its status as a qualified creditor. If, however,
the indebtedness represents more than twenty-five percent of such
creditor's assets, the ownership change will cause the indebtedness
to become disqualified. 9 This rule is intended to prevent an
outside investor from purchasing the stock of a creditor in order
to circumvent the eighteen-month holding period requirement.
Unfortunately, the rule as stated has much broader application
and could disqualify creditors' indebtedness under circumstances
in which no such motive is present.
220
216 Richard Reichler, Presumption of Tax Avoidance Motive in Prop. Regs. Affects Many
Corporate Bankruptcies, 74 J. TAX'N 140, 141 (1991).
217 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(d), 56 Fed. Reg. 47,921 (1991).
218 Id. § 1.382-3(d)(2)-(3).
219 Id. § 1.382-3(d)(4).
220 For example, one commentator suggests that when substantially all of the assets
[Vol. 68:133184
NET OPERATING LOSSES
Although the regulations provide some examples of the types
of claims that constitute indebtedness that arose in the ordinary
course of the loss corporation's trade or business, they still leave
many unanswered questions. Under the regulations, ordinary
course indebtedness includes trade debt, tax liabilities, and certain
non-recurring debts, such as liabilities for torts or breach of
warranty. 22' The question of whether the term encompasses
debts incurred to purchase large capital assets or new lines of
business and debts incurred for unusual events, such as a major
refinancing, remains unresolved.222
Because many corporations have widely held debt that is often
actively traded, such debt is not likely to qualify as eighteen-month
indebtedness and cannot be ordinary course indebtedness because
the same beneficial owners do not hold the debt at all times.
Accordingly, the regulations devote themselves almost exclusively
to defining a third category of qualified indebtedness, widely held
debt.223 Briefly, the widely held indebtedness rules permit a loss
corporation to treat indebtedness held by all less-than-five-percent
beneficial owners as always having been owned by the same own-
ers. If the indebtedness was held for the requisite eighteen-month
period, it would thus constitute qualified indebtedness. 224 The
regulations also provide special rules that the loss corporation can
use in attempting to determine the beneficial ownership of its
widely held indebtedness. These rules are designed to alleviate the
substantial economic burden of such an inquiry.225 Although the
widely held indebtedness regulations are an important contribu-
tion to section 382, they are nonetheless fairly complex and will
of a qualified creditor are purchased, the original creditor and the successor should be
treated as a single entity for purposes of the qualified indebtedness rules. See Timothy
Sherck, The Bankruptcy Exception to Section 382: Section 382(o)(5) 6 (Spring 1990) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
221 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(d)(2)(B)(iii), 56 Fed. Reg. 47,921, 47,925 (1991).
222 See Sherck, supra note 220, at 7. These types of expenditures, unlike tort liabili-
ties, generally would be considered optional and, therefore, may not fall within the ambit
of the proposed regulations.
223 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(d)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 47,921, 47,925 (1991).
224 A detailed discussion of the widely held indebtedness provisions is beyond the
scope of this Article. These provisions, however, have been the subject of several recent
articles. See, e.g., Howell Bramson & Sherry W. Bramson, Prop. Regs. Provide Operating Rules
for Bankruptcy Exception to Ownership Change Limits, 76 J. TAX'N 146 (1992); Robert W.
Wood, IRS Proposes Regulations on NOLs and Bankruptcy, FAULKNER & GRAY's BANKR. L.
REV., Winter 1992, at 35.
225 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(d)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 47,921, 47,925 (1991).
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be of no assistance to loss corporations in certain circumstances,
such as when the corporation's debt is held in bearer name.
While the proposed regulations defining qualified indebted-
ness offer bright-line tests for determining those creditors whose
claims qualify under the bankruptcy alternative, the regulations
severely restrict the debtor corporation's ability to bring in any
new creditors because the claims of new creditors likely will not
constitute qualified indebtedness. As one commentator observed,
"This obstacle to new investors is consistent with the general prin-
ciples under section 382 against the 'trafficking' in loss corpora-
tions. Nevertheless, in the bankruptcy context, where nontax policy
favors economic revival of the distressed business enterprise, the
confirmation of these restrictions will surely be unwelcome."
226
Other uncertainties inherent in the bankruptcy alternative
warrant brief mention. First, it is unclear whether shareholders
and qualified creditors who receive the stock of the loss corpora-
tion under the bankruptcy alternative can transfer their stock
shortly after they receive it without destroying the fifty-percent
continuity requirement. Apparently, the Treasury Department has
indicated informally that a subsequent transfer of equity interests
will not destroy the fifty-percent ownership requirement, except in
a case in which there is a "'binding commitment"' requiring the
transfer of such stock. 27 On the other hand, a private letter rul-
ing issued under section 382 required that creditors of the loss
corporation provide a representation that they would not sell or
otherwise dispose of their stock received as part of the reorganiza-
tion plan.228 Because this issue has not yet been resolved, credi-
tors and shareholders would be well-advised to retain their stock
for a period of time following confirmation of the reorganization
plan to ensure that they qualify for the bankruptcy alternative. 29
Another significant uncertainty inherent in the bankruptcy
alternative is how it will be applied in a consolidated group sce-
nario. Whether the bankruptcy exception will be applied on a
226 Rizzi, supra note 20, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
227 Id. at 139 (citing a comment made by the Tax Legislative Counsel on October
11, 1991, at a meeting of the Practicing Law Institute).
228 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-36-058 (June 16, 1988).
229 This issue is similar to the question under § 351 of the Code as to whether
transferors are in control of the corporation "immediately after the exchange." See I.R.C.
§ 351(a) (1988). In the § 351 context, the issue has been resolved in a manner similar
to that suggested by the Tax .Legislative Counsel in supra note 227 and accompanying
text.
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separate company basis or, instead, on a single entity basis might
turn upon which members of the group are involved in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.3 0 Similarly, whether the bankruptcy alterna-
tive will apply in a situation involving an informal workout that is
not under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court remains unset-
tled. Although the legislative history of the 1986 Act provides that
the bankruptcy alternative does not apply to informal workouts, it
instructs the Treasury Department to study whether the bankrupt-
cy alternative should apply to such workouts.21 Some commenta-
tors have argued that distinctions between formal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and informal workouts are unfortunate because they
encourage loss corporations to seek formal bankruptcy relief,
which is more time-consuming and expensive than an informal
workout.2 2 All of these uncertainties illustrate the difficult deci-
sion that a loss corporation faces in attempting to determine
whether the bankruptcy alternative will apply in its bankruptcy
proceeding and, if so, the effect that the provision will have on its
net operating loss carryovers after bankruptcy.
2. The Special Insolvency Limitation
Unlike the bankruptcy alternative, no specific regulations have
been promulgated addressing issues raised by the special insolven-
cy limitation.21' Although it is more straightforward than the
bankruptcy alternative, several issues remain unresolved that make
its application uncertain.
For example, the statute clearly states that, for purposes of
the special insolvency limitation, the value of the loss corporation
is modified to reflect any increase in the value of its stock attribut-
able to the surrender or cancellation of creditors' claims in ex-
change for stock.234 The resulting increase in a loss corporation's
stock value, however, is often difficult to calculate. Consider the
following scenario: a loss corporation has assets of $200 million
and indebtedness of $350 million, and thus has an equity value of
230 See Blanchard, supra note 151, at 917 n.9.
231 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 322. The Treasury Department was instructed to
study such informal workouts and report its findings to Congress before January 1, 1988.
Id. Formal findings from this study have not yet been announced.
232 See, e.g., Robert A. Jacobs, Tax Treatment of Corporate Net Operating Losses and Other
Tax Attribute Caryovers, 5 VA. TAX REV. 701, 723 (1986); Rizzi, supra note 99, at 132
n.152.
233 But see infra note 236.
234 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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a negative $150 million. As part of a reorganization plan, creditors
exchange $150 million of their debt for half of the loss
corporation's stock, and an outside investor infuses $150 million of
new capital into the corporation in exchange for the other half of
its stock. The exchange qualifies for the special insolvency limita-
tion because there has been an "exchange of debt for stock in a
title 11 or similar case."23 5 Immediately after the ownership
change, the value of the loss corporation will be a positive $150
million, because assets have increased to $350 million and debt
has decreased to $200 million. Is this $150 million of new value
attributable to the cancellation of creditors' claims in exchange for
stock, or is it instead attributable to the infusion of new capital by
an outside investor? If the former, then the loss corporation can
use that value to calculate the annual limitation on the use of its
net operating losses to offset taxable income. If, on the other
hand, the increase in value reflects the outside investor's infusion
of new capital, then the value of the loss corporation still will be
zero for purposes of the special insolvency limitation.
This scenario raises a simple issue: which $150 million, the
creditors' or the outside investor's, brings the loss corporation's
value from an "under-water" amount of $150 million to zero? The
issue has three possible answers. First, the cancellation of
creditors' claims in exchange for stock could drop the
corporation's debt to $200 million, so that with assets of $200
million the corporation's value is zero. In this case, the entire in-
crease in equity value from zero to a positive $150 million is at-
tributable to the infusion of new capital. Second, the infusion of
new capital could raise the corporation's assets to $350 million, so
that with debt of $350 million the corporation's value becomes
zero. Under this approach, the cancellation of creditors' claims in
exchange for stock reduces the corporation's debt to $200 million,
thereby increasing the value of the loss corporation from zero to
$150 million. Of course, this approach offers the greatest benefit
under the special insolvency limitation. Third, the cancellation of
creditors' claims and the infusion of new capital could operate on
a pro rata basis to bring the corporation's value to zero. Under
this approach, the increase in value of the loss corporation that is
attributable to the cancellation of creditors' claims would be $75
million, rather than zero under the first approach or $150 million
under the second approach.
235 I.R.C. § 382(0(6) (1988).
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Unfortunately, there appears to be no guidance as to the
resolution of this critical issue. 236 Thus, in cases where a loss cor-
poration has the opportunity to receive an infusion of new capital
by an outside investor, it will be very difficult for the corporation's
counsel to determine whether the special insolvency limitation or
the bankruptcy alternative will provide greater protection for the
corporation's net operating loss carryovers. Moreover, as one com-
mentator has noted, even in the absence of an outside investor, it
may be difficult to determine the increase in the value of a loss
corporation's stock resulting from the cancellation of creditors'
claims. The commentator emphasizes that if the loss corporation's
stock is publicly traded, the corporation's prior stock value may
already reflect the cancellation of creditors' claims.237 These un-
certainties inherent in the special insolvency limitation may render
its use inadvisable except in the most clear-cut circumstances.
C. Lack of Any Policy Justiflcation for the Bankruptcy Provisions'
Reduction of a Corporation's Net Operating Losses
Even if the election between the- bankruptcy alternative and
the special insolvency limitation were not so complex, and the
provisions were not fraught with so much uncertainty, an amend-
236 Just before this Article went to press, the Treasury Department promulgated pro-
posed regulations under § 382()(6) that provide guidance on this issue. The regulations
generally attribute any increase in the value of the loss corporation's stock as the result
of.a bankruptcy reorganization to the conversion of creditors' claims into stock, rather
than attributing the increase to any infusion of new capital (the stock value test). Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(j)(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 34,736, 64,739 (1992). This provision, however,
is subject to one important limitation:
[I]f the value of the loss corporation's stock exceeds the value that would have
resulted if the loss corporation's creditors had exchanged all of their debt for
stock, the excess cannot be from the direct or indirect conversion of debt into
stock. In such circumstances, the value of the loss corporation is limited to a
value which approximates the value of the loss corporation's stock if the loss
corporation's creditors had exchanged all of their debt for stock (the asset value
test).
57 Fed. Reg. at 34,737 (official comments to Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(j)(1)).
Although these regulations represent an important step toward protecting a troubled
corporation's net operating losses in bankruptcy, they are only proposed, and not final,
regulations. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that they will survive the rulemaking
process. Moreover, as discussed infra note 252 and accompanying text, even if this issue
is ultimately resolved favorably toward debtor corporations, in practice creditors are un-
likely to discharge more debt than is necessary to increase the loss corporation's value to
zero. Thus, even if the regulations become final, they are not likely to be of great as-
sistance to corporations in Chapter 11 proceedings.
237 Sherck, supra note 220, at 28.
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ment to the bankruptcy provisions of section 382 would still be
necessary because both provisions nearly eliminate a debtor
corporation's net operating losses in most circumstances without
any policy justification. Congress enacted the bankruptcy alterna-
tive and the special insolvency limitation in an effort to facilitate
the rehabilitation of financially distressed corporations. In doing
so, however, Congress did not provide a broad rule protecting a
corporation's net operating losses in all circumstances in which
the corporation sought relief under Title 11. Rather, under the
bankruptcy alternative Congress afforded net operating loss protec-
tion only when the corporation's historic creditors and sharehold-
ers retained at least fifty percent of its equity in a Title 11 pro-
ceeding.
At first blush, the notion of treating creditors as shareholders
of a loss corporation, so as to avoid the general limitation of sec-
tion 382, seems generous. In reality, however, Congress merely
codified a long-standing principle, first enunciated in the land-
mark Supreme Court case of Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Lime-
stone Co.,2 3 8 that the creditors of a loss corporation are really its
true owners239 and have borne the losses reflected in its net op-
erating loss carryovers.2 4
Yet at the same time that Congress protected many corpora-
tions in bankruptcy from the reach of section 382's general limita-
tion, it exacted a "toll charge" for such protection. Recall that the
toll charge requires a corporation to reduce its net operating loss
carryovers by (1) paid or accrued interest on debt converted into
stock under the reorganization plan for the year in which the
ownership change occurs (until the date of the change) and the
238 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
239 It is interesting to note that although Congress treats creditors as equity holders
under § 382(0(5), the Internal Revenue Service has reached a contrary conclusion in its
regulations recently promulgated under § 269. "Although insolvency or bankruptcy may
cause the interests of creditors to predominate as a practical matter, creditor interests do
not constitute beneficial ownership of the corporation's stock." 57 Fed. Reg. 346 (1992)
(to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.269-5(b)).
240 BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 299. As one commentator explained,
The approach in TRA '86 of treating creditors in bankruptcy . . . as equity
holders is consistent with a number of other provisions in the Code. Thus, for
example, for purposes of determining whether postacquisition stock ownership
satisfied the statutory continuity of interest requirement, Old § 382(b)(7) treated
a creditor who received stock in a bankruptcy reorganization as a stockholder
immediately before the reorganization.
Rizzi, supra note 99, at 131-32 n.151.
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three prior years, and (2) one-half of the amount which would
have been treated as debt discharge income in the absence of the
stock-for-debt exception.24 1 There is little policy justification for
the interest disallowance provision and none whatsoever for the
debt discharge provision.
The Joint Committee's explanation of the 1986 Act does not
offer a policy reason for the interest disallowance provision. The
only possible justification for the rule is the following statement
contained in the Senate Finance Committee Staff's Final Subchap-
ter C Report: "This rule is based on the notion that the creditor's
interest prior to the change was, in reality, an equity interest and,
therefore, payments made to the holder of the interest should not
be deductible by the corporation. '24 2 While it is true that pay-
ments to equity holders are not deductible, both the legislative
history of the 1986 Act and the Supreme Court's holding in Ala-
bama Asphaltic acknowledge that it is impossible to determine pre-
cisely when creditors' interests shifted from debt to equity inter-
ests. 243 . Accordingly, the interest reduction provision arbitrarily
employs a more-than-three-year interest disallowance rule, implying
that creditors' claims were converted into equity three years before
the year in which the ownership change occurred. No sound poli-
cy considerations justify this implication. Moreover, one leading
commentator has suggested that the interest reduction provision
"may involve more complexity than it is worth."244
Finally, in its present form, the interest provision results in tax
planning that undermines other legitimate public policies. For
example, because interest "paid or accrued" within the requisite
time period results in a net operating loss reduction, commenta-
tors have suggested that it would be foolhardy to waste a debtor
corporation's assets by actually paying intereft that had already
been accrued, since the corporation would suffer a reduction in its
net operating loss carryovers of the same amount irrespective of
whether the interest was, in fact, paid.245 Surely Congress did not
241 For a more detailed explanation of these concepts, see supra notes 183-87 and
accompanying text.
242 SENATE FIN. COMM. STAFF FINAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 250.
243 Alabama Asphalfi 315 U.S. at 183-84; BLUE BOOK, supra note 135, at 299.
244 Jacobs, supra note 232, at 722. The author does go on to say that the reduction
provision is a small price to pay for the bankruptcy alternative, but the article was pub-
lished before the debt discharge reduction was considered by Congress.
245 Halperin, supra note 209, at 153; Sherck, supra note 220, at 13.
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intend that its tax provisions should discourage a corporation from
paying its debts.
Similarly, because a loss corporation's interest deductions are
disallowed not only for the three years preceding the ownership
change, but also for the year in which the change occurs (until
the date of the change), tax practitioners have advised debtor
corporations to delay the effective date of their reorganization
plans from late in one year until early in the next year. Such plan-
ning could reduce the period subject to the interest disallowance
provision by up to twelve months. 246 Counseling clients to delay
their reorganization efforts may well be prudent tax planning, but
it runs contrary to the bankruptcy policy of encouraging prompt
rehabilitation of troubled companies. It is easy to see that these
factors, taken together, suggest that the interest disallowance provi-
sion is not premised on sound policy grounds.
While little policy justification exists for the bankruptcy
alternative's interest disallowance provision, there is no justification
whatsoever for the debt discharge provisions from a policy stand-
point, except as a source of raising revenue. The legislative history
of the 1986 Act offers no explanation for the net operating loss
reduction, which equals one-half of the corporation's debt dis-
charge income protected by the stock-for-debt exception. The
provision was not even part of the Senate Finance Committee
Staff's Final Report. Furthermore, when the drafters of the Reve-
nue Act of 1987 attempted to increase the reduction from one-
half of the debt discharge amount to one hundred percent of
such amount,24 7 they again failed to provide justification for this
net operating loss reduction.
The stock-for-debt exception to the debt discharge rule is
premised on the assumption that the exchange of stock for debt is
really just a substitution of one obligation of a corporation for
another, and therefore is an inappropriate time to realize
gain.2 4 This is especially true in the case of a loss corporation,
where the creditors are the true owners of the corporation's equi-
ty. "[JIudicial recognition of creditor corporate ownership led
courts to conclude that a formal conversion of creditor debt into
stock did not give rise to [debt discharge income]."249 Accord-
246 Sherck, supra note 220, at 13.
247 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
249 Jacobs, supra note 189, at 5.
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ingly, the bankruptcy alternative's requirement that net operating
losses be reduced for such debt discharge income runs contrary to
the policies upon which the stock-for-debt exception is premised.
In addition, from a purely practical standpoint, the net oper-
ating loss reduction for this debt discharge amount could be quite
substantial. Creditors involved in Chapter 11 proceedings often are
forced to accept the debtor corporation's stock in exchange for
significant portions of their debt. The stock usually has a low value
when the corporation emerges from bankruptcy because the cor-
poration must often also retain a large amount of debt. This low
stock value, coupled with the cancellation of a significant amount
of debt in the exchange, would result in a substantial amount of
debt discharge income in the absence of the stock-for-debt excep-
tion. Accordingly, a net operating loss reduction equal to one-half
of this amount can nearly eliminate a corporation's net operating
loss carryovers following bankruptcy.
Finally, the bankruptcy alternative's rule that eliminates a
corporation's net operating losses entirely if the corporation un-
dergoes a second ownership change within two years after reorga-
nization is based upon faulty assumptions. First, it assumes that the
value of the loss corporation at the time of the first ownership
change was zero. While this will often be the case, it cannot be
presumed to be true in every instance. Second, the rule assumes
that any increase in the value of the loss corporation between the
first and second ownership changes will be attributable to
shareholders' capital contributions, which would be disregarded in
determining the value of the loss corporation for purposes of the
second ownership change." Accordingly, the rule assumes that
the value of the corporation at the time of the second ownership
change will also be deemed to be zero, resulting in an elimination
of the corporation's net operating losses. This assumption may be
unfair, especially in turnaround cases in which "the price paid for
the stock in the second change of control is attributable to the
loss corporation's earnings subsequent to the first change in con-
trol and its future earnings prospects, rather than to capital contri-
butions 'stuffed' into the corporation during the two-year measur-
ing period."2"'
250 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
251 Jacobs, supra note 232, at 723.
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The special insolvency limitation differs from the bankruptcy
alternative because it is easier to justify on policy grounds; howev-
er, from a practical standpoint, it suffers from the same problems
as the bankruptcy alternative because it nearly eliminates the
debtor's net operating losses after reorganization. The special
insolvency limitation uses the value of the debtor corporation after
the ownership change for purposes of calculating the general
limitation, thereby reflecting any increase in the value of the stock
attributable to debt canceled in exchange for stock.252 Although
no policy was articulated for this rule, presumably it is again based
on the notion that creditors of a loss corporation have, in effect,
borne those losses, and should be permitted to recoup them in
the form of increased loss carryovers.
While this is a laudable goal, in reality creditors often only
agree to discharge enough debt to make the corporation solvent
(raising the value of the corporation to zero). In such situations,
the special insolvency limitation offers no assistance in preserving
a debtor corporation's net operating losses. The example em-
ployed earlier provides an illustration. In that hypothetical, the
loss corporation had $350 million of debt and $200 million of net
assets. Although it was assumed that the corporation's creditors
exchanged all $350 million of their debt for stock, raising the
value of the corporation to $200 million, the results likely would
be quite different in practice. Under most circumstances, creditors
would be willing to exchange only $150 million of their claims for
stock and would retain the remaining debt. The creditors would
thereby be given preferred treatment up to the value of the
corporation's assets, and the corporation would be left with a
value of zero for purposes of calculating the general limitation.
Thus, as a practical matter, the special insolvency limitation, like
the bankruptcy alternative, cannot adequately protect a debtor
corporation's net operating losses in Chapter 11.
D. A Proposed Solution
"Treasury and the IRS have been on a course to restrict the
ability of a debtor to fully utilize any beneficial tax provisions
related to bankruptcy. It is evident that they perceive these provi-
sions as the 'tax shelter of the 1 9 9 0 s."'25s The government's per-
252 For a detailed discussion of this concept, see supra notes 193-94 and accompany-
ing texL.
253 Eggleston, supra note 215, at 21.
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ception is erroneous and must be changed. Thus far, Chapter 11
bankruptcies have failed miserably. If the Chapter 11 goal of suc-
cessfully rehabilitating financially troubled corporations is to be
realized, section 382 must be amended so that corporations
emerging from bankruptcy can use their pre-bankruptcy net oper-
ating losses to shelter their post-reorganization income from tax.
The resulting incremental cash flow may well be the factor which
allows a troubled company to restructure successfully. 2 4
The starting point for the reform proposal should be the
bankruptcy alternative. It is premised on the sound assumption
that historic creditors of a loss corporation are its true owners and
should be treated as equity holders for tax purposes, thereby'effec-
tuating the policy of tax neutrality by allowing only the owners of
the loss corporation to have unfettered use of its net operating
losses. Under the prop6sal, the general limitation of section 382
will not apply if the historic creditors and shareholders of a debt-
or corporation in a Title 11 proceeding together receive at least
fifty percent of the corporation's stock (in vote and value) pursu-
ant to the reorganization plan.255 Moreover, the corporation will
suffer no reduction of its net operating losses as a result of the plan
because the current reductions for interest and debt discharge
cannot be justified on policy grounds. To prevent an outside inves-
tor from taking advantage of the bankruptcy alternative by pur-
chasing creditors' claims just before the reorganization plan .is
implemented, the definition of a qualified creditor contained in
the regulations under section 382(0(5) should be retained.
Additionally, the rule in section 382(0(5) (D) (that a second
ownership change within two years will reduce net operating losses
to zero) should be eliminated because it is based on faulty as-
sumptions. Thus, if an ownership change is triggered after bank-
ruptcy it will only result in the application of the general limita-
tion. To that end, none of the stock received by creditors as part
of the reorganization plan would be counted in determining
whether there has been a subsequent ownership change. Stock
received by an outside investor, however, would count toward a
254 Set Sniderman et al., supra note 20, at 199.
255 Of course, this provision mirrors the current bankruptcy alternative. Although one
might suggest that creditors merely be treated as shareholders for purposes of applying
§ 382's general limitation, such a proposal will not prove effective because it is impos-
sible to identify their percentage holdings before the ownership change (even though the
creditors are recognized as equity holders for tax purposes).
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second ownership change. Thus, if, as part of a reorganization
plan, creditors receive forty percent of a loss corporation's stock,
an outside investor receives forty-five percent of the stock, and
shareholders retain the remaining fifteen percent, the forty-five
percent interest received by the outside investor would count to-
ward an ownership change after bankruptcy. This rule would pre-
vent an outside investor from purchasing a corporation solely for
its net operating loss carryovers. Without such a rule an investor
could, for example, purchase a fifty-percent interest as part of the
reorganization plan that would not count toward an ownership
change. The investor could then obtain control of the loss corpo-
ration shortly thereafter by purchasing stock received by a creditor
under the plan without triggering an ownership change. The goal
of the bankruptcy provisions is to allow creditors, not outside
investors, to obtain control of the loss corporation without impos-
ing limitations on the use of the corporation's net operating losses
thereafter. Any other rule would encourage investors to purchase
troubled companies solely for tax purposes, a result that contra-
venes the principle of neutrality embodied in section 382.
One of the most effective ways that a debtor corporation can
use the bankruptcy process to reorganize successfully is to disman-
tle and sell off unprofitable lines of its business. The corollary to
the continuity-of-business-enterprise requirement, found in the new
regulations under section 269256 and applicable to loss corpora-
tions employing the bankruptcy alternative, contravenes this bank-
ruptcy tool and runs contrary to sound business judgment by re-
quiring a corporation to continue unprofitable businesses solely
for tax purposes. Accordingly, the section 269 regulations should
be repealed insofar as they relate to bankruptcy proceedings.257
Finally, the special insolvency limitation should be abolished.
It is of little value for most debtor corporations because in most
instances the cancellation of creditors' claims in bankruptcy merely
raises the corporation's value from a negative number to zero.
Moreover, whatever benefit the provision may have is outweighed
by the undue complexity and significant attorneys' fees that are
associated with requiring corporations to choose between the two
alternatives.
256 See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
257 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the author believes that the Sen-
ate Finance Committee Staffs Final Report was correct in asserting that § 269 should not
even apply to transactions governed by § 382.
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Some critics might argue that if Congress amends section
382(0 (5) .to enable debtor corporations to preserve their net oper-
ating losses following bankruptcy and shelter their post-reorganiza-
tion income froh tax, the government will lose the revenue that
could be generated by taxing that income. Although it is difficult
to determine the possible adverse revenue impact that this propos-
al would occasion, the preservation of jobs and increased competi-
tion that would result from implementing this proposal should
counterbalance any lost revenue by decreasing welfare costs and
allowing a once-troubled corporation to prosper.
The proposal -outlined above will undoubtedly have the effect
of preserving a debtor corporation's net operating loss carryovers
in a bankruptcy proceeding under most circumstances. It should
also improve the ability of many corporations to reorganize suc-
cessfully in Chapter 11. Whether the amendment alone can dra-
matically change the success rate of Chapter 11 bankruptcies re-
mains.to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
All experts agree that the Chapter 11 reorganization provi-
sions are not working well in practice. There are two possible
solutions to this problem. First, as some prominent commentators
have suggested, the Chapter 11 provisions can be eliminated, so
that troubled corporations seeking protection under the Bankrupt-
cy Code are forced into liquidation. In the alternative, if one
believes that the fundamental goals of the Chapter 11 provisions
are sound, then it would be preferable to devise approaches that
will improve the Chapter 11 system. The author is of the view that
the Tax Code provisions affecting corporations in Chapter 11
proceedings should be modified in order to'achieve the Chapter
11 goals of preserving jobs, promoting competition, stimulating
the economy, and reorganizing troubled businesses.
This Article does n6t attempt to discern all of the reasons
why the goals of the Chapter 11 provisions have not been
achieved. Rather, it merely suggests that one reason why Chapter
11 has proven unsuccessful is the failure of the Tax Code provi-
sions to preserve a troubled corporation's net operating losses
following bankruptcy. The Article offers a solution which is de-
signed to preserve this valuable asset. Implementation of this solu-
tion will bring Chapter 11 one step closer to achieving its goals.
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